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Chapter I: Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology 
~he far horizons of a phenomenological philosophy, 
the chief structural formations, to speak geographically, 
have disclosed themselves; the essential groups of problems 
and the methods of approach on essential lines have been 
made clear. The author sees the infinite open country of 
the true philosophy, the 11promised land" on which he 
himself will never set foot. '1·his confidence may wake 
a smile, but let each see for himself whether it has not 
some ground in the fragments laid before him as phenomenology 
in its beginnings. Gladly would he hope that those who come 
after will take up these first ventures, carry them steadily 
forwexd, yes, and improve also their great deficiencies, 
defects of incompleteness which cannot indeed be avoided 
in the beginnings of scientific work. 
--Edmund Husserl, rdeas 1, 
Authors Preface to 
1 
the .t;nglish Edition, p. 21. 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is popularly acknowledged as the father 
of phenomenology. 11hile alive, he was recognized as the leader or a 
phenomenological movement. He saw himse~f as a modern Moses leading his 
Is~ae:Iites towards the promised land or a phenomenological philosophy. 
Like the land promised to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and 1·or which they 
longed, phenomenology is said to be "the secret longing of the philosophy 
of modern times;" and vescartes, Hume and Kant are claimed as Husserl's 
philosophical forefathers. 1 Like Moses who saw his promised land from a 
lonely mountaintop, Husserl claimed to see the outstanding geographic 
features of his philosophy. But again like Moses,- he was forbidden to 
enter: he felt obligated to cover only the ground in its immediate 
vicinity. Phenomenology is said to be a land on which he never set 
foot. 
It must be difficult to live with one•s goal in sight while not being 
able to reach it. We search the hearts of men in situations like this in 
hopes of discovering something important about their humanity. But the 
heart of Moses is not open to us. We are told only that after wandering in 
the wilderness for forty years and almost reaching his destination, 
"his eye was not dim nor his natural force abated." Husserl, on the other 
hand, does not present such an enigmatic figure. He too is supposed to have 
retained his keen eyesight. He also claims to see the humour in our doubting 
what he sees from his mountaintop, indicating that he appreciates the irony 
of his situation. He is not without humility and humour himself. His 
inVi£ation to test the old man's eyesight speaks of quiet confidence and 
feelings of philosophical solidity and integri tJ. Let us see to what 
extent these feelings are justified. 
2 
Although Husserl's days of leadership came to an end in 19~8, 
posterity continues to acknowledge him as the father of phenomenology. 
His paternity endures in the supposedly seminal books he has vrritten. 
His thoughts are said to germinate in the soil of other minds. But it is 
not exactly clear to us what he meant by a phenomenological philosophy. 
What is the promised land towerds \'lhich he we.a supposed to be leading other 
philosophers? How near was he able to approach it himself~ This thesis 
is an attempt to answer these two questions. 
students of phenomenology are fond of defining it as the practice 
of letting things speak for themselves. "Back to.the things themselves!" 
is their slogan. 2 Husserl's writings may at first seem to lend support to 
their definition. For example, he writes in the ideas: General Introduction 
to Pure PhenomenolofY that: 
the generalization of the correlative, mutually 
attached concepts "intuition" and "object" is 
not a casual whim, but is compellingly 
demanded by the nature of things. 3 
In The Paris Lectures, he writes that: 
science demands proof by reference to the things 
and facts themselves as they are given in 
actual eA'}lerience and intuition. Thus guided, we, 
the beginning philosophers, make it a rule to 
judge only by the eVidence. 4 
.1:1e claims in the Cartesian Nedi tations that: 
the idea of science and philosophy involves ••• 
a beginning and a line of advance that ••• 
have their basis "in the nature of things 
themselves."5 
These passages testify that the popular slogan captures the spirit of 
Husserl's endeavour. They al.so indicate its importance as a methodolor:ical 
principle for a philosophy which pretends to be scientific. They do not, 
3 
however, champion it as an adequate definition. 
Without denying its usefulness in defining phenomenology, i.t can 
be pointed out that the popular expression alone is apt to be misleading. 
The expression "Back to the things themselves!" brings to mind Hume's 
positivistic doctrine that "all our simple ideas ••• are derived from 
simple impressions which are correspondent to them and which they exactly 
represent. 116 With Hume's picture image theory of ideas in mind, it is 
tempting to think of phenomenology as an empiricism in the style of 
Locke's, Berkeley's and Hume's. But actually, it originated in Husserl's 
and Brentano•s criticism of the British empiricists. 7 
Husserl's definition of phenomenology includes more information 
than the populc'-r slogan. In fact, enough is included to distinguish it 
from British empiricism. ''Phenomenology," Husserl frequently says, 
"figures as a science within the limits of mere immediate intuition, 
a pure descriptive science of Essential Being.rr8 The words that recur 
again and again in his definitions are essential being, immediate 
intuition and descriptive science. To clarify Husserl's definition,· 
it must be shown what kind of things he wanted to return to, how he 
proposed to get back to them, and wh&t methodological role the 
commandment to return to the things themselves plays in a scientific 
description. 
(1) Husserl's Idea of Essential Being. 
Let us first examine Husserl's idea of Essence or Essential Being 
(Wesen) to deternine what kind of things he wcints to return to.9 
Husserl was preoccupied throughout his philosophical career with the problem 
of how to account for the objectivity of human knowledge. So central was 
4 
this problem to his interests that his intellectuaJ. development could 
be described as a Growing awareness of the universality of his praolem. 10 
in 1891, seven years after receiVing his doctorate in mathematics, 
Husserl began his philosophical career by publishing the Philosonhy of 
Arithmetic in which he ~ried to account for the objectiVity of mathematical 
knowledge by tracing its fundamental concepts to our ability to notice the 
aggregate chc.racter of our perceptions.11 Realizing the close connection 
between mathematics and loc,"ic, Husserl made another attempt to expla:i..n 
wha~ mrures this type ot knowledge possible in his Lot~cal Investiriations, 
published 1900-1901, where he repudiated the psychologistic Views which 
he supposedly expressed earlier in the Arithmetic. 12 Nevertheless, in the 
second volume of the Investigations he continued to analyze both logical 
concepts and our consciousness of them. Finally realizing the universality 
of his problem, Husserl described his Ideas: General Introduction to Pure 
Phenomenology, published 1913, as 11a fresh formulation of the transcendental 
problem which forecasts with objective necessity the true meaning of an 
objective being that is subjectively knowable. 1113 At this point, Husserl 
recognized that what maKes any object subjectively knowable is its 
Essential Being. In Ideas 1 Husserl attempts to articulate this insight. 
His later works, Cartesian tHidi tations published l 931 and The Crisis of 
European Science and ·.i:re.nscendental Phenomenology published 1936, are 
concerned with the task of extending the application of this insight to 
t/ie world we live in (Lebcnsvrcl t). 
The work occupyine the pivotal position in Husserl's philosophy is 
Ideas 1 beco.use there for the first time he realizes the universality of 
his problem and tries to articulate the notion of Essential Being as its 
5 
answer. An examination of the first chapter of Ideas 1, entitled 
''Fact and Essence", should give us an idea of whet Husserl means by the 
14 term ~ssential Being. 
The problem of the foundetion of objective knowledge seems to de~and 
that Husserl should trace our knowledge of objects to its source. This is 
precisely what he does. The kind of knowledge he examines in chapter one 
is our knowledge of facts. Factual or natural knowledge, he says, begins 
with our experience of individual things. Nature or the world is taken 
to be nothing more than the sum-total of these individuels. '.l'hey are 
first given to us as obJects of perception; we have "outer" perception of 
physical objects, "inner" perception of ourselves and our stc,tes of 
consciousness; and we become acquainted with other people through 
15 
"empathy" and by perceiving their bodily behavior. f.'e shall later 
sub-divide the problem of natural knowledge into those of the object of 
perception, the world of obJects, and other people in the world. But 
for the present our concern is for the common foundation of all three 
types of knowledge. 
All natural knowledge is based on our perception of individual things. 
What does it mean for something to be perceived as an object? Husserl 
se.ys that: 
An individual object is not simply and quite generally an 
individual, a "this-there" something unique; but being 
constituted thus and thus "in itself" it has its o\'m 
supply of essential predicables which r.iust qualify it 
(qua "Being as it is in itself"), if other secoygary 
relative determinations are to qualify it also. 
A perceived object, for example, an individual tone, is a unique thing 
existing here and now. Its existence here and now we call its "Real 
6 
17 Being." But there are several things v1e can s&y e,bout it that we can 
say with equal justice about other unique individuals. First of all, 
it is a part of its being that is should exist under the general ruberic 
individual, in this case, as an individual sound. It also has its own 
supply of essential predicables "which can be justly applied to a number of 
other perceived objects." The "corr.moo element" which makes this possible 
is their "Essential Being". It is part of the meaning of a perceived 
object that it should have "Essential" as well as "Real" existence. 
Any object of perception has essential existence. Its essential 
being is no more simple than its real existence. In his Logical 
Investigations, Husserl offers whole and part, subject and quality, 
individual and species, species and genus as a -few of the essential 
structures in which the existence of an individual object is involved. 18 
These essential structures may be divided into two radically different 
kinds. ve may use Husserl's exa~ple of a tone to illustrate the 
distinctive logic of each kind. First, a tone exists as a whole having 
parts. These parts may, in their turn, be analyzed into yet other perts. 
The fornier relationship of a whole to its parts belongs to the kind of 
essential being Husserl calls formal.. By this he means that the relation-
ship applies equally well to any object of perception. It is not peculiar 
to any class of them. 
The individual tone has another kind of essential being besides its 
formal essence. This kind of essential being can belong to some individuals 
and not to others. ~he tone, for example, can be subsumed under a material 
essence. It can be classified as a sound. 19 
Later, in ldea.s 1, Husserl especially werns us not to confuse the 
7 
subsumption of ~ individual under an essence with the subordination of 
20 that essence under a hi0her species or genus. The class of sounds, for 
example, can be subordinated to a higher genus, object-of-one-of-our 
senses. To confuse the former with the latter would be a case of 
confusing a material with a formal relationship. 
An object of perception, in the broedeat sense possible, is a whole 
which can be analyzed into parts; it is also an individual v1hich can be 
put into a class v.rith other individuals. Its essential being is both 
formal and material. 
But factual knowledge is suppose to tell us about unique individuals. 
In neither case does the individual seem to be unique. The uniqueness of 
an individual can be reconciled with its essential being in the following 
way. Using Husserl's example of the tone, we find thct it has an element 
of "this-herenessil. We can fix the time and the place at which it can 
be heard. Its uniqueness conSists in the fact that at no other time or 
in any other place can I hear as I do here a~d now. A perception is 
unique. under no circumstances does it return to me individually the 
21 
same. Nevertheless, I and any number of other people can hear the 
same tone or the same tonal structure at different times and places. 
We do so, for example, whene~er we hear an orchestra perform Beethoven•s 
Ninth Symphony. I know I can listen to the same symphony again and again 
even th 1 I h th dit t . 22 ou:; l cm never ave e same au ory sensa ions. 
A perceived individual can be both an object and subjectively knowable. 
Its uniqueness is due to the unique spatio-temporality of our perceptions, 
and its objectivity to the esseice under which it is subsumed or into 
v.hich it can be divided. This is the meaning of an objective being which can 
8 
be subjectively known. 23 The essence or an individual tells us wh:o:t it is, 
while the this-thereness of our perception tells us of its real 
24 
existence. 
Essences are the foundation of factual knowledge in the sense that 
they make possible our awareness of individuals as objects having part-
whole relationships and he.vine; membership in certain classes. All 
factual knowlede;e, all scientific analysis and classification of perceived 
individuals depends on the recognition of their essential being. It is 
the essence of what we perceive that accounts for our awareness of 
individuals as objects. 
When factual knowledge is collected scientifically, the objectivity 
of the resulting scientific doctrines depends upon the perception of 
individuals. The most fundamental procedures of a factual science are 
the analysis and classification of "this" individual perceiver to be "here". 
All factual sciences share this dependency regardless of wnether they are 
natural sciences like physics, biology, physiology and psychology, or 
sciences of man like history, anthropology and sociology. 25 
The factual sciences require a justification of their procedure. 
The analysis and classification of individuals is justified only if "every 
fact includes an essential factor of a material order. 11 The essential 
being "oust furnish a law th0t binds the given concrete instance, and 
26 generally every possible one as well." 
An individual may be said to he.Ve essential being in tv10 different 
ways: formally e.s a whole having parts, and materially as a member of a 
class. The subordination of a class to a higher genus is a case of 
purely formal eidetics not involving the indiv~dual at ~11. Since the 
formal relationship of a w:'.lole to its :perts preclude special reference 
to any inriividual, the foundation of the existence of a perceived 
individual as an object must be its material essence. Husserl sa~s that 
the most inclusive material essences delimit regions or catecories of 
27 individuals. '.L'hese regions are the foundation of all factual knowledge 
and all factual sciences. If it is really the material essence of what 
we perceive that accounts for our awareness of individuals as objects, 
then Husserl's search for the foundation of knowledge should be directed 
by the question of how he proposes to return to the essences themselves. 
(2) Husserl•s Idea of Immediate Intuition. 
Husserl claims that the poEsibility of the seeing of essences 
. . 28 
tWesenschauJ is involved in our perception of individuals. Our seeing 
of a class, for example the class of tones, is involved in our perception 
of one of its class members (i.e., this tone here). Husserl sucgests 
that any empirical intuition cnn be transformed into an essential insight: 
Empirical or individual intuition can be transformed 
into essential insight \ideation)-a possibility 
which is itself not to be understood as empirical 
but as essential possibility. The object of such 
insight is then the corresponding pure essence or 
eidos, whether it be the highest cateeory or one 
of its spec;§lizations, right down to the fu~ly 
11 concrete. 11 
Any empirical intuition which gives an indiVidual object to conscious-
less can be transformed into an essential insight. The transfoI'l:lation 
· s accomp~ished by an act of ideation, or to use the se.ne example, by 
vhinking of the class of which the individual is perceived to be a member. 
~he act of ideation has the character of a dator act, that is, it gives 
30 ~n object to consciousness. Its object is one of the classes of which 
10 
the individual is e member. Husserl does not say so, but presuMably ~he 
seeing of each higher de6ree of generality is the yroduc~ of anotner 
higher act of ideation. 
Immediate intuition presents an object to consciousness. There are 
two kinds of intuition, the perception of individuals and the essential 
intuition of generalities of a class of individuals for exnmple. One kind 
of intuition can be transformed into another. But the two kinds remain 
distinct because they are directed towards particular and general objects 
respectively. 
Essential intuition, however, can be confused with the procedures of 
induction and formalization because all three of them operate within the 
realm of the universal. As a result of this confusion, the essences or 
things themselves of Husserl's phenomenology may be mistaken for 
inductive or formal generalities. When these three kinds of knowledge 
are distinguished, Husserl's ideas of essence and essential ~ntuition 
will be made clearer. 
Husserl warns us not to confuse the inductive generality of natural 
laws Ylith the essential generality of eidetic judgments. 31 He offers 
tfie proposition "all bodies are heavy•• as an example of such a J.aw, and 
he contrasts it with the eiditic generality of the claim that "all bodies 
are extended". These differ on three counts. First, naturai laws cust 
refer to individuals having real existence, while eiditic judgments like 
the geometrical one used in Husserl's example need not. 
Furthermore, the inductive generality of natural laws is founded on 
the actual perception of individuals, while eiditic generalities are 
grounded in essential intuitions, for example, of the classes of which 
J1 
the perceived individual is a member. We can infer that all bodies are 
heavy only after feeling the weicht of several objects. On the other 
hand, we do not need the perception of several objects to tell us that 
all bodies ere extended. The foundation of this stvtemcnt is the 
intuition of several essences. Having had intuitions of the essences 
•material t~ing' and •extension•, we are compelled to recognize that 
the class •material thing' must be subordinated under the larger class 
•extended thing•. The objects of these intuitions are necessarily 
connected. Induction differs from essential intuition and is founded 
upon it. 32 
The intuition of a necessary connection between essences in our 
example points to another difference between inriuction and essential 
intuition that Husserl never fully articulates. He says that the latter 
33 .. have an uncondi~ioned generality while the former do not. ·this means 
that eidetic judgments based on the intuition of enough essences are 
necessarily true, while inductive judgments besed on t:1e perception of 
a reasonable number of individuaLs may not be true at all. It is 
standard procedure in the nature sciences to test a hypothesis by experi-
menting w::i.th individuals. When enough experiments confirm the hypothesis 
and none disconfirm it, then induction gives it the stetus of a natural 
law until another hypothesis which explains the same facts more elegantly 
can be established in the same inductive manner. More experiments 
increase the likelihood that a hypothesis is true. But the possibility 
that it is t"a.Lse always remains in spite of the most precise observations, 
because of the restricted rane;e of things observed. If at any time a 
natural phenomenon "Violates" a natural law, then its lawfulness is annulled. 
12 
Laws of nature at best describe it. They have no prescriptive power. On 
the other hand, an eiditic judgment based on the intuition of the essences 
involved in the judgment nust be true. It is no accident that the obser-
vation of real objects confirms its truth. 'fhe intuition of their essential 
nature tells us that it could not be otherwise. Because, in Husserl's 
example, the essence 'material thing' must be subordinated to the essence 
•extended thing•, we will never find a material object which is not 
extended in space. 
Similarly essential intuition and formalization can be clearly 
distinguished. Phenomenology is not an inductive empirical science, 
but it is not a formal deductive one either. 
~ssential intuition and formalization differ.in one respect. 
Essential intuition allows us to see formal and m~terial essences, 
while formalization allows us to see only those of the formal kind. 
Formalization precludes individuals and classes which have individual 
members. 34 Its lowest classes (infimae species) have no "material content." 
'i'he generalization of material essences, on the other hand, does not. 
uet us use Husserl's example of lived space to illustrate the difference 
between formalization and the intuition of essences. Formalization of 
. 35 
Spece produces an idea Which reduces Space to its Euclidean counterpart. 
·::hen we treat lived space purely quanti ta ti vely and according to Euclid 1 s 
rules, we abstract from some of its essential features. Lived space, 
for example, is full of colour; but a formalized idea of spcce does not 
distinguish red from blue spe.ces. Generalize.tion of space, on the other 
hand, distinguishes coloured from uncoloured spaces, spec1fices sub-classes 
of co~oured space ~i~e red and b~ue, and offers yet more distinctions within 
13 
36 
each sub-class. Generalization and formalization are two species 
of essential intuition. Formalization is distinguished from the intuition 
of essences as a species is distinguished from its genus. 
(3) Husserl•s Idea of a Descriptive bcience. 
The intuition of essences is the foundation of the science of 
phenomenology. To reveal the scientific structure of phenomenology, we 
must specify what his idea of a science is, end how he proposes to 
construct a science upon his foundation. His Logos essay, "Philosophy 
as a Rigorous Science," published in 1911, remains the clearest articulation 
of his scientific ideal. Husserl contrasts his idea of philosophy as a 
rigorous science with the kind of philosophy he calls a "world-view•• 
(Wel tanschauung). 37 A true science, he says, has "scientific" foundations, 
"scientific" problems, "scientific" methods, and there is a certain 
logical harmony amongst the three of tnern. 38 
Let us first examine Husserl•s idea of a scientific foundation. The 
foundation of a Weltanschauung is not the accomplishment of an individual 
person. lt has its roots in the cultural corununity or his time, 39 and its 
fruits in the collective consciousness of his contemporaries who try to 
persuade him that it ofrers an objectiviely valid view of the world. 40 
neltanschauung philosophy has a social foundation. It is offered to the 
individual as a whole, and he must come to. terms with it in his lifetime. 41 
'.1.'he steps of a truly scientific philosophy take it in the opposite 
direc~ion. Its foundation is the observa~ions (Anschauungen) of the 
individual. 42 As we have seen, the seeing of essences (Wesenschau) is the 
Kind 01· Anschauung that Husserl's phenomenoloe;y is based on. .c.ach person 
14 
can add only modest building blocks to the structure of a science which must 
43 
always remain incomplete. Finally, individual research lead~ to a 
44 
cor:rn:uni ty of scholars. The dynamics of the two philosophical tendencies 
may co-exist in the same person and in the same comraunity. While naively 
accepting much of his Weltanschauung, the scientific researcher continues 
to construct "new fragments of strict doctrine" on the basis of his 
observations. Once in a while they may conflict, as for example the 
Aristotelian world-view and Galileo's "strict doctrines" did in the 
seventeenth century. 
Scientific problems also differ from those of a Weltanschauung. The 
latter are dictated by a tradition. Galileo's strict doctrines had to be 
problematic for the world-view of his contemporaries. Truly scientific 
research, on the other hand, does not begin with a tradition~ but with a 
dedication to the problems and the problematic demands stemming from them. 45 
Galileo dealt with the problematic nature of the moon, for example, by 
observing it through a telescope. Something with an observable nature 
demands to be observed. A scientific problem, then, is one which is allowed 
to dictate the researcher's methods of investigation. This is the source of 
the loGiCal harmony which exists .between the problems and methods of a 
science. 
46 The methods of a science are dictated by the sense of its problems. 
The self-awareness required for the satisfaction of these demands 
distinguishes scientific methods from those of a Weltanschauung. 
The method of modern physics, for example, is hypothesis, followed by 
experimental verification and induction from the results of the experiment. 
On the other hand, no one could say exactly how he cot his world-view. 
Husserl realizes that a self-reflective method is the oark of all sciences. 
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"Every bit of completed science," he says, "is a whole composed of 
thought-steps each of which is immedictely understood. 1147 
Before Husserl's phenomenology can be recognized as the science he 
claims it is, a harmony between its foundations and methods must be 
discovered. The exact nature of this harmony must be specified. 
16 
Chap~er II: Methodology 
Existentialism may be on the trail o:f more vital, more 
frui.tful insights than pure phenomenology. But it has still 
to lec:rn a few lessons from the older phenomenology, 
particularly from· Husserl. one 01· these is the injunction 
which I heard him address to an informal group of students 
when he criticized Max Scheler's much more rapid, but not 
equally solid production, "One needs bright ideas, but one 
must not publish them." Another lesson is his insistence 
on the need of making sure of the epistemological groundwork: 
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"One must not consider oneself too good to work on the 
foundations." It is such lessons, °lessons of philosophical 
solidity, in~ergity, and humanity, which both phenomenologists 
and existentialists still have to learn or to relearn. 
--Herbert Spiegelberg, 
11Husserl•s Phenomenology 
and Sartre's Existentialism." 
Phenomenology: The Philosophy 
of Edmund Husserl and its 
Interpretation, ed. 
Joseph Kockelmans (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday and Co., 
1968), p. 266. 
If Husserl•s phenomenology is to be called a science, it must exhibit 
all of these characteristics: a foundation in the immediate intuition 
of objects, a dedication to the demands stemming from the probletiatic 
nature of the objects intuited, and a method dictated by the demanding 
nature of its problems. The foundation of phenomenology in the immediate 
intuition of objects has alreedy been sufficiently illuminated. 
A science must exhibit a dedi"cation to the demands stemming from 
the problematic nature of its objects. The natural sciences, geometry 
mathematics, logic, each discipline must be sensitive to the object of 
its own special interest. Husserl says tha_t phenomenology supplies the 
definitive criticism of every fundamentally distinct science, and in 
particular, the determination of the sense in which their objects can 
1 be said to be. His distinction of objects into individuals, material 
essences, and formal essences exhibits a dedication suited to this task. 
What remains undetermined is the nature of the harmony between the 
foundation and the methods of phenomenology. The question of whether 
Husserl's phenomenology can be called a science will be decided by the 
degree to which his method has become self-reflective. 
Herbert Spiegelberg•s personal memo~ies of Husserl indicate thet the 
father of phenomenology was keenly aware of foundational problems, and 
thet he did not consider himself too good to work on them. It was likely 
this feeling of humility thc.t prevented him from en-cering the promised 
land of a phenomenological. phil_osophy. He seer:is to have felt compelled 
to C:edicete his life to its ground',\ork. We should expect him to have 
done a considerable amount of work on the foundation of his method. .i..et 
us see how he articul~tes a theory of scientific method on the foundction 
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o:f the intuition of essences. 
(1) The Principle of All Principles. 
·.L·he guiding question of this chapter is how Husserl can use the 
intuition of essences as a methodological foundation. Its usefulnecs is 
described in the second c:1ap"ter of Ideas 1 under tne heading "the 
principle of all principles" which Husserl expresses in the followint; manner: 
primordial dator intuition is source of authority for know-
ledge ••• whatever presents itself in intuition in primordial 
form ••• is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, 
though only v:i thin the limits in which it then pres en ts 
itself ••• 1!.Very statement which does nothing more than give 
expression to such date ••• is thus really an absolute begin-
ning ••• a principium. But this holds .. in special measure of 
the essential judgements of this class that are general in 
form, and it is t~ these that the term "principle" is 
normally applied. 
In this passage Husserl addresses the connection amongst intuitive, 
reductive, and expressive endeavours. He says that when objects are first 
intuitively given to consciousness, they are simply to be accepted for 
what they appear to be. Conversely they are not to be accepted as 
anything they do not present themselves.as being. The resulting 
phenomenoloe,ical description is nothing more than an expression 
"general in form" of what has been observed. 
The first principle of Husserl's method is a two-fold injunction: 
describe that which has been observed; do not speculate e.bout the unseen. 
"Back to the things themselves!", the popular slogDn of Husserl's followers, 
only expresses half of his first principle. The foundation of phenomenology 
as a science on the immediate intuition of objects really generates two 
demands. They, in turn, give rise to others. Husserl's reductive project 
should be interpreted as a technique for systematically anticipating and 
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preventing all forms of specul~tion. Its vc.rious steps have their source in 
the dem8nd not to speculate about the unseen. Similarly Husserl's descriptive 
project and its various steps ere derived from the injunction to describe 
everything that appears exactly as it presents itself. 
Husserl's ability to derive both projects from his first principle of 
method depends on its having a double nature. Its two demands must be 
incontrovertably different. Otherwise the scientific nature of his 
endeavour will not be appreciated. Some of Husserl's interpreters, 
J.M. Bochenski and Quentin Lauer for example, seem not to recognize the 
difference between them or the correspondingly different reductive and 
descriptive projects. 3 However, one philosopher who appreciates the 
difference between Husserl's two principles and explains its methodological 
importance is William James. 
In his essay, "The Will to Believe", published in 1897, James 
anticipates Husserl's first principle of method. He approaches the 
problem of religious belief by writing that there are: 
two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion--
ways entirely different, and yet we.ys about whose difference 
the theory of knowledge see~s hitherto to have shown little 
concern. We must know the truth; and we must avoid error--
these are our first and great commandments es would-be 
knowers; but t:1ey a:re not two ways of st.<.·ting an identical 
co::nmandment, they are t\•10 separate laws ••• 
Believe truth! Shun error! --these we see are two 
mc:i.terially different laws; and by choosing bet\1een them we 
may end by colouring difrerently our whole intellectual 
life. ~'!e may rer;ard the chase for truth as p;;ramount and 
the avoidc:nce of error as secondary; or we may ••• treat the 
avoidnnze of error r,s more imperative, and let truth take its 
chance. 
IBoth James and Husserl apprecie.te the real nature of the difference 
roetween the deli.ends to know the truth snd to avoid error. Both 
philosophers recognize them as the first and most fundamental principles 
of method. The differences between the pragmatism of J cimes e.nd Husserl• s 
phenomenolo[;y are ultimately due to the fact thet Jemes gave primacy 
to the former, and !:fusserl to the latter. In his esse.y James argues 
that in spite of the risk that it might be wrong, "we have the rii:;ht to 
believe at our own risk any hy:pothesis that is live enough to tempt our 
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wiJ.l. 11 " Husserl, on the other hand, strove to est&-blish a philosophy 
without presuppositions, and claimed for phenomenology the unique 
6 function of criticizing all other sciences and itself at the S£cme time. 
We may conclude from this thc.t there is a real difference between 
the two demands of Husserl's first principle; that the two projects 
stemming from them are really different; that the commandment not to 
speculate about the unseen has priority over the injunction to describe 
what has been observed; and that the reductive project should precede 
the descriptive one. With the two projects sufficiently distinguished, 
it now becomes possible to see how they a.re grounded in Husserl's first 
principle. 
(2) The Reductive Project. 
Husserl's remarks about the famous reductions of phenomenology are 
scattered throughout Ideas 1. His reductions are techniques for anti-
cipating and preventing all forms of speculation. Even though they follow 
from Husserl's desire to a_void error, their purpose is not purely negntive. 
~esides directing the philosopher away from speculation and its inevitoble 
errors, t~1ey also point towards something else Husserl calls 
transcendental subjectiVity.7 Husserl seems to mention four different 
types of brackets. They are philoso,1hical, eidetic, phenomenolo2ical and 
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transcendental. But the transcendentaJ. and the phenomenolo~ical 
reductions are rea1ly the same one seen from two different points of view. 8 
So, in theory, there are really only three different reductions. Let 
us examine them individually before trying to explain how they ere derived 
from the commandment not to speculete about the unseen. 
The philosophicel reduction is mentioned only once and then only 
briefly. It leads the phenomenologist away from philosophical theories 
and. points towards the observation of objects as they appear in intuition. 9 
Philosophical. speculation about the ultimate source of indiViduals, their 
unperceived enstence, etc. are eliminated. t'hey are irrelevant to the 
project of searching for the foundation of objective knowledge. Husserl 
thinks that this kind of reduction Will allow him to address his problems 
outside of the tradition of philosophical speculation. He seems to consider 
himself here as a scientific researcher separating himself as much as 
possible from the Viel tanschauung of philosophy. this reduction does not 
mean that the phenomenologist is not allowed to speak of philosophy or to 
entert£.in various philosophical theeries. He must not, however allow 
these theories to influence the description of what he has seen. 
•rhe eidetic reduction also performs a negative and a positive task. On 
the negative side, ell reference to the individual and particular ere to 
be omitted from phenomenolo[ical description after the eiditic reduction is 
10 performed. ~peculations about the e:ti.stence, the source, and the 
eXistentia1 stetus of universals are eliminated. Positively cons1dered, 
this reduction specifies the kind of intuited object whic£1 shou!d receive 
special. attention. Phenomenological description may start with the 
observation or imagination of individuals, but thereafter should concentrate 
22 
on the intuition of essences. 
Eiditic reduction is absolutely essential to phenomenology because it 
1s the operation that distinguishes it from British empiricism. Hume, 
for example, says that simple ideas are caused by simple impressions 
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which they faintly copy. Husserl, on the other hand, is unalterably 
opposed to any theory which fails to recognize that the object of perception 
and the object of ideation differ, not in degree, but in kind. Individuals 
and essences are different kinds of.things. The eiditic reduction ensures 
that their difference is recognized. Spiegelberg would say that Hume and 
anyone else refusing to make the eiditic reduction commit what he calls the 
sense-orgsn fallacy: 
Another obstruction to an open-eyed approach 
to the phenomena might be called the sense-
organ bias. It could be formulated as a 
principle: nothing is to be recognized as a datum 
unless it can be assigned to a specific sense 
organ (in the biological .organism) as its 
receptor. A good many positivistic rejections 
of phenomenological data, such as the denial of 
distance perception, may well be y~cribed to 
some such negativistic prejudice. 
Hume's copy theory of ideas is a good illustration of the sense-organ 
fallacy. It asks us to believe th8t each of our simple ideas copies 
one of our impressions and therefore can be assigned to a specific 
sense organ. This kind of "empiricism" also impoverishes our experience 
by sug£esting that each of our impressions of the world we live in 
13 has its own proper sense organ. British empiricism fails to recognize 
the rich diversity of the kinds of human knowledge 8lld their various 
objects. Husserl will settle for nothing less than a theory of knowledge 
Which recognizes the intuition of essences. 
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Finally the phenomenoloeical reduction, much like the other ones, 
performs a dual purpose. After its applicetion there should be no more 
reference even to the essence of intuited objects. 14 The phenomenological 
reduction ensures that intuited essences will not be reified, hypostatized, 
or spoken of as if they had substantial existence apart from anyone who 
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classifies individuals or formalizes their relationships. The phenomenologist 
must not clai::i th.st essences are anything more than intuition presents them 
to be. The ultimate reduction refers the phenomenologist away from objects 
and towards transcendental subjectivity or the stream of consciousness 
15 ~hich is supposed to be the ultimate goal of phenomenology. 
The reductive project of Husserl's philosophy, as a systematic attempt 
to anticipate and avoid aJ.l types of speculation, is grounded in the 
methodological principle which demands that there should be no speculation 
about the unseen. Husserl's first principle of method calls for the 
~eduction of theories to individuals, of indi~duals to essences, and 
~f essences to the stream of consciousness in which they are constituted. 
"he reductive project is systematic in the sense that the philosophical 
. 
~pokhe should be applied first, followed by the eiditic, and finally the 
phenornenoloQ.cal reductions. When properly understood, the reductive 
lroject is seen to be a propadeutic to the descriptive one. 
(3) The Descriptive Project. 
Husserl shuns error by refusing to speculate about that which he 
cannot see. His first principle also demands tnet he should seek the truth 
as far i=!S he can by d0scribing thin;;s a.s they appear to him. The second of 
thece demands also generates a complete project involVing several operations. 
If Husserl's descr~ptive methods are as scientific as his reductive 
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techniques, each operi:;tion must be distinct from the others, and all of them 
must have their foundation in the intuition of objects. 
Let us first distinguish each operetion of the descriptive project 
in the same way tilat Husserl would. In a section of I de as 1 entitled 
"The Heference o.f Phenomenology J:3ack to its Own Self, 11 Husserl says 
that phenomenology: 
has to place before its own eyes as ins~ances certain 
pure conscious events, to bring these to complete 
clearness, and within this zone of clearness to subject 
them to analysis and the apprehension of their essences, 
to follow up the essential connections that can be clearly 
understood, to grasp what is momentarily perceived in 
conceptual expressions, of which the meaning is prescribed 
purely by the object perceived or in some way transparently 
understood. 16 
The five techniques of which Husserl speaks can be distinguished and 
elaborated in the following way: 
(1) Individual pure consciousness events (i.e., intuitions of objects) 
are to be regarded as instantiations of essences (that is, as members 
of cle.ssesJ. 
(2) The class memberships of each individual are to be made completely 
clear and distinct. (Anything clearly presented to consciousness can be 
noticed. 'l'hings distinctively presented are so noticeable that they 
cannot be confused with anything else.) 
(3) Each clee.rly and distinctly presented essence tor class) is to be 
apprehended. 
(4) The noticeable connections amon.gst intuited essences \i.e. the 
subordination of a species to its genus) should be followed up 
\i.e., to their highest genus). 
( 5) The foregoing intuitions and their objects should be described 
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"in faithful conceptual expressions" exactly as they have presented 
themselves. 
There are five distinct techniques, four of them involving intuition, and 
one of them the expression of what has been intuited. 'l'here can be no 
doubt that each of the five i~ different. 
The last and most crucial of these techniques deserves special attention. 
Having overcome one kind of positivism with its eidetic reduction, 11usserl 1 s 
phenomenology must not fall victim to another. There is an empirical 
positivism of which the philosophy of David Hume is a good example. 
According to its te:iets, intuition only of individual objects is possible, 
and then only those which cmi be assigned to a specific sense-organ in the 
biolocical org.onism as its receptor. Against this kind of positivism 
Husserl maintains that we have intuitions of essences as objects which 
differ in kind from individual ones, and which eidetic reauction makes it 
possible to see. But there is also a positivism of expression whose basic 
assumptions are that discursive language is the only means of expression, 
and that anything which cannot be expressed discursively is meaningless. 
Suzanne Langer attributes this kind of positivism to Bertrand Russell, 
18 Rudolph Carnap and some other analysts of language. From their point of 
View, the various arts say nothing which discursive language cannot say 
"!:letter, and anything Vlhich resists tr~mslation is meaningless. Because 
this doctrine impoverishes the realm of expression in much the same way that 
Hume's sense-organ fallacy impoverishes the empirical one, we could call 
it the fallacy of impoverishing expression. There are other varieties of 
"f i 13 a thful conceptual expressions" besides "judgments general in form." 
\':e must expand our notion of expression to include all of them, for instence, 
the musical expression of Beethoven's Nint:1 Symphony, or the poetic ex-
ression of James Joyce's novel Ulysses. But that is not a project we can 
undertake here. 
For our purpose it will be sufficient to say in general that 
the expression of what has been seen, along with the intuitive parts of the 
descriptive project, must be grounded in the demand to describe things 
exactly as they present themselves for observation. After individuals 
are perceived or imagined, it becomes possible to concentrate on their 
essences or class memberships. When these become sufficiently clear, .they 
can be recognized. Then essential connections can be recognized amongst 
them. Finally it becomes possible to describe everything that has been 
seen. Each step in the descriptive ptoject is founded on the insightfulness 
of the step which preceded it. All of them have their ultimate foundation 
in the intuition of objects. 
For a complete view of Husserl's theory ~f method, the relationship 
between reductive and descriptive projects must be outlined, Each reduction 
is a section of the handrail that helps us up the stairs of insight one 
step at a time. The philosophical reduction makes the intuition of objects 
possible by eliminatine speculations about them. The eidetic reduction 
makes the intuition of essences and essential connections possible by 
putting the uniqueness of individuals into brackets. Finally the 
phenomenological reduction makes the description of intuited objects 
possible by eliminating reference to anything beyond the stream of 
consciousness. 
The examination of Husserl's theory of method has established that, 
theoretically, his method deserves to be called scientific. Husserl seems 
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highly aware of what he is doing when he spe<'.k.S of the pre.ctices of 
phenomenology. His theory of phenomenological method can be re-constructed 
on the be.sis of his principle of principles. Theoretically, there is 
a certain harmony between the foundc.tions and methods of phenomenology. 
It remains for us to discover ~hether Husserl's philosophy is actually 
as scientific as his theory o·f me-chod represents it to be. Let us see 
how near husserl has been able to approach his promised land. 
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Chapter III: Method 
If this procedure in its unsophistica~ed form serves 
at first only to mc-..ke one at home in a ne'l'i doI!lein, 
to practice seeing, apprehending, analyzing generally 
within it and to encourage some acquaintance with its 
data, ~then) scientific reflection upon the essential 
nature of the tyPes of presentation which play their 
part within it, upon essence, performance, conditions 
of complete clearness and insight, as well as of 
completely true and steady conceptual expression, 
and more of the same kind, undertakes the function 
of a general and logicelly rigorous metncdic 
grounding. Followed up deliberately, it te.kes 
on the character and rank of scientific method; 
and this in any given case, in the application of 
rigorously formulated methodic standards, per~its 
of the practice of a limiting and improving 
criticism. 
• 
-Edmund Husserl 
Ideas 1, p. 174 
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Husserl's phenomenological method, as he aescribes it, cDn be diVided 
into two different projects ~nd their guiding principle. 'l'he principle of 
all principles is the injunction not to speculate about the unobservable, 
but only to describe that which can be seen. It is the most elemental of the 
three and the source of the other two. Secondly, the graded t-educti.Ol\ is 
supposed to eliminate the possibility of speculation with the result tha_t 
the phenomenologiEt • s eyes are directed towards something which ce_n be 
observed. ·.1:he descriptive project is an attempt to clarify and describe 
exactly what is there to be seen. 
not only does Husserl's methodology prescrib~ a definite order in the 
use of principles and projects, it also suggests a further order in the steps 
of each of them. 'l'he principle of principles comes first: it provides the 
impetus for all phenomenolog:ical endeavour. ·1·he reductive project should 
follow since nothing can be observed and described before it has been 
pointed out. Finally whatever is seen can be described. 
'l'he graded reduction consists of a series of reductions which are 
meant to follow eachother in a definite order. Individual objects cannot be 
observed unless he disregards theories about their ultimate source, their 
unperceived existence, etc. tlusserl calls the exclusion of these theories 
the philosophical reduction. !~or can the common essence of individuals be 
discerned before their uniqueness is eliminated from consideration. ·1·he 
elimine.tion of individuality :i:'.usserl calls the eiditic reduction. J.n order 
to describe the common fe;;tures discerned, the phenooenologist must restrain 
himselr frot1 speekine; about anything more thccn the constitution of objects 
in th,; streexa of consciousness. Husserl ce.lls chis type of restraint 
phenomenological or transcendental. It seems that the philosophical reduction 
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should be followed by the eidecic which should be followed by the 
phenomenologicol one. 
Simile.rly, Husserl's injunction to d!scribe that which can be seen 
prescribes a definite order in the five steps of the descriptive project. 
An individual. should be observed first. Its presence may then be clarified 
and analysed. • When it has been clearly and distinctly presented, its 
essential features will reveal themselves. Then they can be observed. 
Then the individual.may reveei itself as essentially connected to other 
individuals. This too should be noticed. Finally the observer should accurate 
express everything which has been seen. Any variqtion in the order of steps 
would destroy their insightfulness since eaeh of them builds on the insight 
of the step which preceded it. 
Although we may construct a complete theory of method on the basis of 
Husserl's scattered methological remarks in Ideas 1, we cannot be sure of 
our interpretation until we verify that the intentions of this theory are 
actually fulfilled in practice. Husserl says apologetically that his 
procedure in its unsophisticeted form may serve at first only to make us at 
home in the phenomenological domain; but that if we think deliberately about 
what he has done, we may be able to understand, limit, and improve his 
techniques. 
Let us make ourselves at home with Husserl's techniques for dealing 
With the problem of objective knowledge. Let us sub-divide the problem into 
those of the obj~cts of perception, the world in which they are perceived to 
eXist, and the other people in the world who perceive them. After 
fQ~iliarizing ourselves with his phenomenological treatment of these 
problems, we m~y be able to point out some of its limitations and perhaps 
even suggest a few improvements. 
(1) The object of perception 
"We perceive things." This simple claim engenders one of the perennial 
problems of philosophy. What do we mean by the expression "to perceive" 
something? What do we mec:n by so.ying that "somet.•ing" is perceived? 
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The history of philosophy bears witness to the difficulty of these questions. 
They have been approached from idealistic end realistic points of view. 
Both schools of thought have "explained" what an object of perception is 
and how we come to know such a thing. But philosophy is embarrassed by this 
profusion of thought. Because the competing 11explanetions" are imcompatible 
with each other, a doubt is cast upon both of them. If Husserl's phenomeno-
logical approach can cut this Gordian knot, the ground will have been 
cleared for genuine understanding. 
of his Ideas 1 where he does the 
I propose to examine the fourth chapter 
1 groundwork:. 
But firsi; t.he problem should be given an historical context. Its 
formal statement is too vague to serve a philosophical purpose. 
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) will serve to illustrate the realistic position, 
and George Berkeley (1685-1753) the idealistic one. 
(i) Descartes on the problem. 
Two questionable ste.tements about the object of perception may be 
derived from the philosophy of Rene Descertes. One is metaphysical; the 
other is part of a theory of knowledge. 
According to Desc0rtes• Medit~tions on First Philosonhy (published 
1641) we do not directly acquaint ourselves ~~th an object through our 
senses. Descartes tries to verify this claim by ex~unining a piece of wax 
he hris taken freim a beehive. 2 It is sweet-tasting, smells of flowers, 
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feels hard and cold; when struck, it emits a sound; and it hes a definite 
shape. These perceptions compel him at first to think that the piece of 
wax is a sweet tasting, flowery smelling, hard, cold, sound emitting, 
definitely sh~ped object. 
But after moving the piece of wax towa.rds his fireplace, he finds 
that is has become a tastless, odourless, hot fluid which cannot be struck 
to produce a sound in the way that it formerly could; it seems to be an 
indefinitely shaped puddle. Descartes• senses tell him that what he sees now 
differs completely from what he had noticed beiore, And yet, not unsurpris-
ingly, he knows that he is looking z.t the same pie.ce of wax. 
Descertes draws a conclusion from his meditation on the wax, one which 
no one would doubt or disagree with. An object perceived to be cor:1pletely 
different is nevertheless known to be the same. From this indubitable 
fact Descartes concludes: 
I must therefore admit that I cannot by way of images 
comprehend what this wax is, and that it by the mind 
alone that I (adequately) apprehend it ••• \'ihat was 
especially to be noted is that our (adequate) 
apprehension of it is not a seeing, nor a touching, 3 
nor an imaging ••• but is solely an inspection of the mind ••• 
bodies a re not cognized by the senses or by the 
imagination, but by the understen.ding alone. 4 
Desc~rtes believes that consciousness does not reach out to its objects 
throug·h our senses or imagination; only e.bstract thought unmixed with 
sensc.tions or images can reveel their true nature. 
The metaphysical corollary of Descartes' epistemolobicoJ. doctrine is 
th.::1t perceiv2ble qualities are not real properties of an 
to him, objects appear to have simple and complex propert 
the simples (extension and other mathematical properties) 
perceive should be attributed to theobject as it is in itself. Speaking 
of the objects we seem to perceive, Descartes claims that: 
they are not perhaps exactly such as we apprehend by 
way of the senses; in many instances they are 
apprehended only obscurely and confusedly. But we must 
at least admit that whatever I there clearly and 
distinctly apprehend, ie; generally speaking, 
everything comprised in the object of 5pure 
mathematics, is to be found in them ••• 
sensuous apprehensions have been given me by nature 
only as testifying to my mind what things are 
beneficial or harmful ••• For this they are ••• 
sufficiently clear and distinct. But what I have done 
is to use them as rules sufficiently reliable to be 
employed in the immediate determination of the essence 
of bodres external to me; a nd as so employed, their 
testimony cannot be other than obscure and confused. 6 
It seemed to Descartes that the absolute clarity and distinctness of simple 
mathematical properties mark them as real properties of an object; only 
pure mathematics can be used to determine exactly what a given object is. 
vescartes thought thet the other properties of objects, those which we 
perceive, merely indicate the effect an o_bJect has on us. ·1•hey too appear 
clearly and distinctly; but only sufl'icien-cly so as to determine whether the 
perceived object can benefit or harm the perceiver. 
'l'he property wmch best illustrates Descartes' metaphysical doctrine 
is prob&oly the sweet taste of the wax. He would likely have argued that 
its sweet taste indicates the possible presence of something beneficial. 
But the nourishing benefit we may gatierfrom it is something distinct from 
its tastiness which merely points to our needs and their possible 
satisfaction. The taste of the wax therefore does not reveal anything 
essential about its nature. 
Descartes sought to make it possible for modern science to describe 
natural objects by means only of pure mathematics. His search ended with 
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these metaphysical and epistemolo~ical doctrines: only mathematical 
properties are real qualities of an obejct; we become acquainted with them 
only by mea ns of abstract thought. On the other hand, sensible qualities 
are not real properties of an object; and we cc:.nnot directly acquaint 
ourselves with an object through our senses. Cartesian realism, With its 
distinction between mathematical and complex sensible qualities, 
has ever since the time of Descartes enjoyed the same degree of prestige 
and popularity as modern science itself. 
(ii) Berkeley on the problem 
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The idealistic philosophy of George Berkeley1 Bishop of Cloyne, was 
unlike Descartes' in that it attracted no following. Indeed, at first 
it attracted hardly even any criticsl attention. Nevertheless his 
metaphysical and epistemologicel doctrines and their supporting arguments 
present the greatest problem for Descartes in particular and the philosophy 
of science in general, for a ccording to Berkeley, a perceivable object is 
nothing more than the sum of its sensible qualities; therefore, we acquire 
knowledge of an object only through our senses. 
Berkeley tried to support his claims through several different lines 
of argument. The most important of these may be found in his Three 
Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (published 1713), a work he was 
careful to preface with a warning against the "common principles of 
philosophers" who would teach us to distinguish the "real nature" of things 
from "that which falls under our senses". From this distinction,, 
he sutgests, arises nothing but scepticism and paradox. 7 One of his 
declered purposes in writing the Dialogues is to return men from these 
pci.radoxes to their natural attitude. He clai:ns to be the spokesrwn for 
8 
common sense. 
At first both Hylas and Philonous seem to express common sense Views 
as they agree that sensible th±ngs are "nothing else bui; so many sensible 
qualities or combinations of sensible qualities. 119 Hylas, however, Will not 
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agree to the additional 3erkeleyan Vieu (proposed by Philonous) that sensible 
qualities are nothing but "ideas in the mind" because he thinks that it 
endangers "the reality of sensible thincs". Consequently he makes two 
attempts to avoid the d~nger. 
}'irst he tries to distinguish amongst sensible qualities, se.ying that 
some are really properties of an object while oth~rs are not: 
sensible qualities are by philosop hers diVided into 
primary and secondary: The former are extension; figure, 
solidity, gravity, motion, and rest, and these they hold 
exist really in bodies. ~he latter are; •• all sensible 
qualities beside the primary; which they assert are only 
so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the 
mind. 10 
It is significant that the qualities liylas wants to attribute to the objects 
of perception tend to be mathematical ones. The tendency he expresses here 
approaches the meta physics of modern science. But he cannot think of an 
adequate reply to Philonous who argues that perceived extension and all 
other primary qualities of an object vary with the position and condition 
of the perceiver as much as the secondary ones do. Philonous argues, for 
exa1;~ple, that the object of perception grows or diminishes in size as 
the observer approaches or retreats from it. 11 Perspectival variations 
in the size of a perceived object are subjective, nothing but "ideas 
in the mind." 
Finally fiylas can see no other alternative than to withdraw .from the 
orJ.ginal .ac;reement that sensible things .e.re nothing more than the sum of 
their sensible qualities: 
It has just come into my head, Philonous, that I have 
somewhere heard of a disr.inction between absolute and 
sensible extension. Now though it be acknowledged that 
great snd small, consisting merely in the relation 
which other extended bein£S hiwe to the parts of our own 
bodies, do not re8lly inhere in the substances 
themselves. Yet nothing oblig~~ us to hold the same with 
reg;:rd to absolute extensi on. 
Similarly he distinguishes absolute from perceivable motion and suggests 
that the sEme distinction should be applied to the other primary qualities 
of an object. Hylas• distinction results in the idea of an object not 
only as something more, but as something completely other than its 
sensible queiities. It is now completely mathematical. There is no longer 
any difference between his concept of an object and Descartes•. This 
dis-i;inction amongst qualities is not unlike the one Newton ( 1642-1'/27 J 
makes in his Mathematical Principles of Ne,tural Philosophy (published 
1687). l3 
Let us now examine what is probably Berkeley's strongest argument 
that an 14 ooject is nothing more than that which falls under our senses. 
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'l'he follo\7ing line of resoning can be abstracted from Beriteley• s diaJ.ogue form: 
SuPPRESSED 
(1) 
( 2) 
c.3) 
( 4) 
SuPPRESSED(5) 
SuPPRESSED(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
Extended objects can be divided into parts. 
They are divisible if and only if their parts can be 
distinguished from each other. 
Distinctions amongst parts are made possible 
by something sensible 
(and extended). 
Absolute extension is insensible. 
Extended objects are absolutely extended or they are not. 
If they are, they are not divisible into parts, (by 2 and 3) 
But extended objects are divisible into parts. 
Therefore it is impossible to think that absolute 
extension is a property of extended objects. 
After being led to this conclusion by Philonous, Hylas claimo that he has 
not had enough time to think about fallacies they may have committed while 
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argµing.. But we c.:n be sure that Berkeley means to present an irrefutable 
chain of thoueht. In arguments such as this one, Berkeley ~as presented great 
problems in the pholosophy of science. The argument suggests not only that 
extended objects could heve no parts if they were .absolutely extended, 
but also that there could be no inc.iYidual objects! In absolute space·, 
none of them could be divided from the rest. Re concludes that the 
extension of perceivable objects is nothing more than. the sum of its 
sensible qualities; and he would certainly have wanted to say that the 
same holds true for the rest of its prim!q'y qualities. 
Because of his doctrine that an object of per~eption is the sum . 
of its sensible qua,.lities, Berkeley believed that "sensible things are 
only to be perceived by sense or represented by the imagination .n15 
Now we find that the ar~uments of Berkeley and Descartes have 
produced a stalemate. Berkeley cannot cope with Descartes' argument from 
change: if an extended object (i.e., a piece of wax) is no ·more than 
the sum of its sensible qualities, and if all the ones it has at a given 
moment are replaced by others, then the result must be a different object. 
But the same object remains. Therefore it must be wrong to suppose that 
an object is the sum of its sensible qualities. Nor could Descartes have 
responded to Berkeley's argument from the divisibility of objects: if an 
extended object is something more than thet which falls under our senses 
(i.e., if it is absolutely extended), and if anything insensible is 
indiVisible, then extended objects cannot be divided into. parts. But 
extended objects can be divided into parts. Therefore it must be wrong to 
suppose that extended objects do not fall under our senses. If both men 
have argued rightly, then their contradictory theses Vitiate each other and 
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a valid concept of the object is impossible. 
(iii) Husserl's Solution 
The fourth chapter of Husserl's Ideas 1 begins with the announcement t~1.::,t 
16 the possibility of his bracketing technique has yet to be established. 
He claims to be involved in the general project of explaining what is 
17 
means to be conscious of something. The examples he uses to illustrate the 
ossibility of reduction in his project are his perception of a piece of 
paper on the table in front of him, a.nd his perception of the table itself. 18 
His choice of examples involves him in Descartes' and Berkeley's problem. 
Although Husserl's operations in chapter·four·correspond roughly 
to his theory of method, they are in some respects at variance with one 
another. The first principle of method is not to speculate about the 
unknown, but only to describe what can be seen. His description of 
consciousness is an exact application of the rule telling him to describe 
what he can see. But it also calls for the suppression of speculative 
theories before anything is described; and in Husserl's own words, "we 
start with a series of observations within which we are not troubled with any 
19 phenomenological epokhe." He did not explicitly bracket anything before 
he began his description. We shall reconsider this methodological problem 
after verifying his theory of description. 
According to Husserl's theory of phenomenological description, 
consciousness of something should be described in five steps. They should 
appee.r in the following order: first the observation of indi·:idual 
conscious events, followed by the clarification and analysis of what has been 
observed, the apprehension of their essence, the following up of their 
essential connections, and finally the exact description of everything that 
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has been seen. 
Husserl begins by describing his experience of a piece of paper, "in 
20 its pure singularity" He distinguishes the cogitatio (perceptual e:xperience) 
from the cogitatum lthing perceived). The piece of paper lay on the table in 
front of him. Around and about it were books, pencils, and an ink well. 
His perceptual experience, on the other hand, was a "turning towards" 
it, a "singling out" from the background of other objects; his perception 
of the paper had "a zone of background intuitions." The paper was 
singled out by "a free turning of the loolt," whereupon his perception of 
the paper was transferred from a non-actual consciousness to an actual 
orientation, from dormancy to wakefulness. Husserl sees that the trans• 
ference occurs as a "stream of experience." This observation completes 
the .analysis of his perception. 
Closer eXB.!nination reveals that the singular characteristics of 
Husserl's perception of a piece of paper also belong to other modes of 
consciousness. We are similBJ"lY aware .of things in memory, imagination, 
expectation, and in various other ways. Husserl observes that in spite 
of all variations in modes of consciousness, "all that we nave stated 
concerning perceptual experiences holds good, obViously of these other 
experiences, essentially different e.s they are. 1121 Therefore, the singling 
out, the figure on a background, the free turning of the look, the dormancy-
Wakefulness structure, and the s'tream of experience are essential. 
structures of consciousness. 
l-urther variations of consciousness establish that it is essentially 
connected to something. When Husserl turned towards something, singling it 
out from a background, he was aware of an object. "It belongs as a general 
feature to the essence of every actual cogito to be a consciousness of 
something. 1122 But when he was no longer actually aware of it, when it 
was present only in the background of something else he had turned towards, 
he was still conscious of the same thing; only then he we.s a.ware of it in 
a different way. Consciousness of an object survives VGxiations from actual 
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to non-actual modes of consciousness. Therefore consciousness is essentially 
related to an object. Husserl calls this property its intentional 
1 t . hi 23 .re a ions p • 
.r·urther descriptive efforts establish that the essencial connections 
between perception and the object perceived is not. yet clear enough to be 
followed up. Husserl asks what we mea.'l when we sey (as Descartes did) 
that perception and extended objects each have their own essence; he asks 
how they can be cognitively interwoven if they are different. And finally 
he asks whether perception and thinghood (as Berkeley asserted) share 
thi . 24 any ng in common. Husserl tries three times to reply to his questions: 
first from the natural _point of view, _then as modern scientist; final.J.y 
he succeeds when the application;·~of brackets allows him to take the 
phenomenoloeical standpoint. Presu::1ably his success illustretes the pos-
sibili ty of, and the proper place for, the epokhe in phenomenological 
description. 
Husserl tries to observe and describe. the esse:lce of perceptual 
intention while remaining in the natural standpoint. However, perception 
appears only to be an empty essenceless looking-towards an object full of 
properties with which it comes into contact in some astonishing way. 25 
l'he natural -standpoint has earlier exhausted its material. There is 
nothing to be discovered about the ini.:entiona lity of consciousness from 
---
this point of view. Its failure signals the need for a new app·roach. 
ausserl tries to carry on the description from t!1e v:tewpoin-c 
of moderu science by distinguishing the object of perception from the 
object of physics. <:hile the object of perception has sensible qu&li ties 
and is esc.entially connected to consciousness in some mysterious way through 
them, the physical object is qualified by atomic elements, ions, energies, 
end space-fillinG processes which can oe approached only by means of 
mathematical expressions. 26 ~he perceived object in sensible space is 
only a sign of the true thing, the physical object. Likewise, perceivable 
space is to be distingui~hed from, and recognized ·as only a sign of, 
the mathematical space studied by.modern physics. 27 
The distinction, however, does not prove to be an illuminating 
one. The relationship between perception and its object remains mysterious. 
And.now the real object is thought to. be even more remote from perceptual 
consciousness. We are confronted by the additional problem of the 
relationship between the object of perception and the object of physics. 
And the question of the connection between pure methematical reasoning . 
and the physical object also remains unanswered. 
Husserl seeks to win a deeper insight into the intentionality 
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of consciousness through the technique of phenomenological reduction. Its pos-
sibility in the project of describing the awareness of objects soon becomes 
eVident. The application of brackets means thet: 
we shut off the Ylhole of physics and the whole 
domain of theoretical thoue;ht. We rem8in within 
the framework of plain intuition and the ·28 
syntheses that belong to it, including perception. 
Although this passage stresses the eliminc•tion of the theoretic~l object 
studied by modern physics, we should not allov1 its er.:~ihasis to overshadow 
the fact that all other theories of the object are also elimineted. 29 Nor, 
apparently, can we address even the object of perception. Husserl says that 
we can only observe the framework of intuition and the syntheses that belong 
to it. 
Al though it seems that r'elation to an object cannot be described 
within these limits, this is precisely whet Husserl does. He constructs a 
framework by rising and walking around the table at which he was seated. 
By keeping it steadily in view as he walks around it, he finds that his 
perception of the table never stops changing. It is a continuum of 
30 
changing perceptions, or as he has said before, a stream of experience. 
Nevertheless he knew th&t the table remained the table: 
Only the table is the same, known as identical 
through the synthetic consciousness which 
connects the new perception with the 
recollection.31 
ttusserl' s circular framework of intuition establishes the identity of the 
table through syntheses of perception and.recollection. The same synthesis 
which produces a continuum of changing perceptions also produces awareness 
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of an object which appears with ever increasing compl.eteness. Since the ta.ble 
is known to be continuously the same while ~usserl 1 s perception continually 
changes, it r.iust be something more than "idea in the mind." 
Even if Berkeley was right to think that an object is nothing more 
than the sum of its sensible qualities, he was wrong to think thE,t they are 
purely subjective. By extending the sa-~'e c2.reful description to the colour 
of the tEJble, Husserl proves they are not. 
The perceived ti.:ing in general, and all its parts, 
aspects, and phases, whe~her tile quality be primary 
or secondary, nre necessarily transcendent to the 
perception, and on the same grounds everywhere. The 
colour of the thing seen is not in principle 
a real ph~se of the consciousness of colour; 
it appears, but even while it is appearing 
the appeerance can e.nd must be continually 
changing, as experience shows. -rhe same colour 
appears in continuounly varying patterns of 
perspective colour variations. Similarly for 32 
every sensory quality and every spatial shape! 
Since the sensible properties of an object can also be known t·o remain the 
same while our perception of them veries, Berkeley was wrong to argue thet 
sensible quaJ.ities are purely subjective. 
Berkeley's argument that a perceived object grows or diminishes 
as an observer approaches or retreats from it exhibits a fundamental error 
in theory of perception. If we wanted to give it a name, we might call it 
the fallacy of confusing a perspected variable with its perspectival 
variations. Husserl .explains very clearly the difference between the 
two: 
We must keep this point clearly before our eyes, 
that the sensory data which exercise the function 
of presenting colour, smoothness, shape, and so 
forth perspectivally ••• differ wholly and in 
principle from colour, smoothness, shepe ••• 
The perspective VE.riation is en experience. But 
experience is possible only as experience, and 
not as something spatial. 'l'he perspected vc:.riable, 
however, is in principle possiole only as spatial 
(it is indeed spatial in its essence), but not 
possible as experience. 33 
Secondary or sensible qualities of an object belong to it, not to 
consciousness. Like the object they belong to, they ere given in experience, 
but differ in principle lrom it. Failure to distinguish between tI1em can 
only end in paradox and scepticism. 
It is no let:s a fundamental error to suppose, as Descorl;es did, 
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that perception fails to come into contact with the thing itself. Husserl 
sheds some light on this fundamental error when he observes thc:.t perception 
of an object is not an image or a sign of its presence. 34 ·,'i'e collapse 
into nonsense when we confuse these different maces of presentation. The 
perce})tion of things does not present something that is not present. There 
is nothing li. e., no sign vehicle) medie.ting consciousness and its object. 
We do not observe two things, a sign vehicle and its meaning. .:e are 
simply aware of an obJect, only one thing. 
(iv) Husserl's Method 
l1usserl 1 s description addresses itself to ver~eley•s and Descartes• 
problem with no small measure of success. He has established (contra 
Berkeley) that experience and its object are essentially dif1'erent, and 
(contra Descartes, that they are intentionally rele.ted. 
Husserl's search for the essence of consciousness follows his theory of 
description fairly close~y. But his use of brackets seems to repudiate his 
theory of reductions. Nor on the basis of ghet he has done can we sa:y that 
the relationship which is supposed to hold between the reductive and 
descriptive projects has been completely verified. 
Husserl says that consciousness is essentially related to an object. 
He took five steps to reach this conclusion. He reflected upon his 
perception of a piece of paper. He observed the perception in its pure 
singularity. Theoretically, its clerificntion and analysis are supposed to 
follow. First he analysed it, distinguishing several structural elements. 
After verying his modes of consciousness of the paper and discovering that 
the same structural elements persisted, he concluded th:..t they belong to the 
essence of consciousness. '~'he observction of essential connections required 
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a special effort. Husserl concluded that consciousness is essentially 
connected to an object only after observing that it persists throughout the 
various parts of a structure. Then he specified the synthetic nature of 
their connection. Lastly, and not without some rhetorical clumsiness, 
he recorded everything he saw. 
His apparent use of brackets fails to correspond with his theory of 
bracketing. Theoretically, there are philosophical, eidetic, and 
phenomenological reductions; and they should be applied in the order 
demanded by the principle of principles. 
Closer examination of Husserl's method revea1s that although he 
mentioned only the phenomenological reduction by name, he seemed to use 
the other two as well. Their use, however, does not follow the order 
prescribed by his theory. First he seemed to make use of the eidetic 
reduction. He reflected upon his perception of a piece of paper in 
its pure singularity. But his analysis of that pure conscious event is 
expressed in general terme which could apply equally well to other modes 
of consciousness. His description does not have special reference to the 
unique historical event of Husserl perceiving a piece of paper. Since 
special reference to the individual is precisely what is eliminated by 
the eidetic reduction, we must conclude from this that Husserl has 
covertly made use of it. 
Secondly, the phenomenological epokhe mentioned and used just before 
.i-Iusserl' s final descriptive effort conceale two sepD.re.te reductions. He 
used it to eliminate all metaphysicol theories about the object of 
perception and its properties. Earlier in Ideas 1 he gRve the name 
"philoso!Jhical reduction" to this usage. 35 .After refusing to address any 
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theories of the object, he also refused to address the intentional object. 
Instead he proposed to dec,cribe only the framework of his intuitona of it. 
The latter refusal is an instance of phenomenological bracketing. So it 
appecrs that, a.11 three reductions have been used, they were not applied 
in the order theoretically prescribed. 
Furthermore, Husserl 1 s last reducticn bears e, disquieting resemblance 
to an operetion which occurs at the very beginning of his project. After 
distinguishing his perception of a paper from the paper he perceived, he 
excluded the paper from further consideration. Are we not bound to consider 
this also as an application of phenome:!ological brackets? If so, then the 
theoretical order of the brackets has been completely reversed, the 
phenomenological one being used first, the eidetic next,followed by the 
phiLosophical, and then the phenomenological brackets again. 
Theoretically, the application of brackets shouJ.d precede 
phenomenological description. Contrary to theory, Husserl claims to have 
made a series of observations without troubling himself with the phenomen-
ological epokhe. How can theory and practice he reconciled? The 
principle of all principles directs the phenomenologist not to speculate 
about the unseen, but only to describe what he has observed. Since this law 
should be applied to every st'ep in llusserl's descriptive procedure, we have 
eood reason to think each of his observations is preceded by a reduction 
of some sort. 
In spite of his claim to the contrary, he does seem to .:ipply brackets 
before each observation. ;Jut observations and brackets <lre not coupled 
in the way thet llusserl rs theory of method leads us to believe that they 
Should. ~.usserl;s excluoive preoccup;::tion with the pure conscious event 
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of his perception presupposes the exclusion of the thing perceived. His 
earliest observction must nave been preceded by a phenomenological 
reduction, not the philosophical one his theory seems to require. 
Secondly, the analysis of his purely singular act of perception 
iS expressed in general terms which apply equally well to other modes of 
consciousness. Furthermore, even when applied to perception, tl1ey do not 
have special reference to the unique historical event of Husserl 
perceiving the paper. ~inc& the eidetic reduction eliminates special 
reference to the individual, it is safe to conclude that Husserl's 
analysis presupposes it. 
Theoretically, the eidetic reduction is supposed to precede and 
make possible the intuition of essences. But actually, it has preceded and 
made possible the analysis of a perception, albeit in general terms. 
its analysed elements are recognized as essential to consciousness only 
after surviving variations in its modes. If the eidetic brackets have 
made the intuition of essences possible, it is the variation in modes of 
consciousness which made it possible for them to be recognized as such. 
Finally Husserl is able to follow up the essential connection 
between consciousness and its object only after performing philosophical 
and phenomenological reductions. Although the situation seems to call 
for the suspension of essences not essentially relctted to eachother, 
Husserl•s theory of method supplies no such thing. Nor does he use it here. 
his use of the philosophical and phenomenological brackets is eminently 
successful, but no reason for, or justification of this usage is offered._ 
uusserl • s. theory of phenomenological description accurately outlines 
his descriptive method. '!'he relc.tionshiµ which is theoretically supposed 
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to hold betwe~n the descriptive and reductive projects has garner~d less 
supporting evidence. Finally his theory of reductions seems almost to be 
repudiated by his use of brackets. However, it :nay yet be redeemed in other 
phenomenological investigations. 
(2) T-he world of Objects 
(;ii ven Husse.L·l • s doctrine of the obJect, the problem of the world is a 
problem which he must face. If we We~t to know the essence of an obJect, 
that which will tell us what an object of perception is, 1-1usserl says that \1e 
must describe it exactiy as it is given to consciousness. One of its essential 
features, as we have seen, is to be found cunongst_other objects. ~o object 
of perception is an object simpliciter: it is never simply given by itself. 
Every object that we can perceive is an onject in the world. If Husserl 
is to ma ke us understand wha~ he means by an obJeCt perceiYed to be in the 
world, he must tell us what he means by world or 11 background11 • So if the 
probiem of the world goes unanswered, his earlier philosophical endeavours 
in Ideas 1 will remain incomplete. 
The problem of the world, however, is not a special problem for the 
phenomenologist alone. It is a universal philosophical problem, albeit 
one which should hold a special interest for a philosopher of science. 
Such a man is Alfred North Whitehead, whose exegeais36 of Husserl's problem 
establishes it as something more than a problem which must be faced 
simply because one chooses to take the phenomenological approach in 
philosophy. 
Ci) Vihitehead on the problem. 
Whitehead begins by pointing out the inevitability of the problem. To 
live in a world we must try to understand it and communicate our 
understanding to others. Each succeeding generation discovers that former 
views of nature were mistaken. The passDge of time throws a doubt on all 
37 laws of nature. 
Nevertheless, most people cling to the fundamental view of nature 
from which these divergent laws arise. Nature, first of all, is character-
ized as the world as interpreted by reliance on clear and distinct sensory 
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experiences, visual, auditory and tactile." What we clearly and 
distinctly see are'::material objects supporting "various qualifications such 
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as shape, locomotion, colour, or smell, t 1139 e c. These material objects are 
connected purely through spatial relations like being next to, a long 
40 distance from, or actually contacting, and so forth. Natural events are 
changes of the qualities of objects, or changes in their spatial relations. 41 
nThis is the grand doctrine of Nature as a self-sufficient, meaningless 
complex of facts. '742 It is the doctrine of the autonomy of physical science." 
This view of nature is consonant with common sense, and can be 
verified at any moment of our existence. Yet modern thought has been forced 
to abandon every one of these notions while retaining the idea that 
scientific Views of nature are autonomous. The result, Whitehead says, 
43 is a complete muddle in scientific thought. 
The first tenet of our common sense view of nature to be nbandoned by 
modern science is the belief that natural objects have sensible qualities 
like colour, sound, and scent. S±nce Galileo (1514-1602) distinguished the 
sensible from the mathematictJ. properties of an object, and designated the 
latter as the proper subject for scientific investigFtion, physics has 
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concerned itself only with the quantitative aspects of nature. Sensible 
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qualities of natural objects are no longer reg~rded as a part of the world, 
as ~hitehead says, they are thought to be the mental reactions of the 
percipient to internal bodily motions. 45 The conclusion thct Whitehead draws 
from this change in Viewpoint is thet "sense perception, for all :tts 
practicG-1 importance, is very. supn•ficial in its disclosure of the nature of 
. 46 things.n 
The notion that physical objects exhibit only spatial relationships is 
anotlrer common sense belief that has been abandoned by the sciences. 
Sir Robert Boyle's (1627-1691) theories of motion and magnetism accounted 
for these phenomena by postulating a medium for their transmission. 47 
Transmission theories of light· and sound also demand a medium for their waves 
and particles. So, in spite of its empty appearance, space was supposed to 
be occupied by subtle kinds of matter called ether. The modern physicis.t 
regards tae world as a plenum, a field of force and actiVity whose energy and 
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actions can be e:xpressed in mathematical formul~e. 
A corollary of the new View is the elimination of physical objects. 
If there is no empty space, then there t;c.re no c;istinct material things 
supporting the mathematical properties which the physicist tries to discover • 
.c·he whole world is full of material which is usually rarified, but cen be 
exceptionally dense in sone places. The so-called material objects we 
49 perceive, on this theory, are merely "knots in the ether" , or 
exceptional places where matter is more dense th;::.n usual. .i:he physicist is 
now able to explain the interconnectedness of more naturD.L events. l:lut 
he has done so a.t tne expense of contradicting our rno:Jt 1'undainental con:mon 
senGe ideas about nature. Physical sciences contradicts the evidence of 
our senses. l'his contradiction levds i.hitehee.cLto point out wh&t he .thinks _ 
is ••the extreme superficie.11 ty of the broad generalizc.tions Which mankind 
acquires on the basis of sense perception."50 
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The muddle in sciencif1c thoucht of which ;.'ihitehead speaks occurs for 
two reasons: the scientist has retained the doctrine of the autonomy of the 
sciences; ~nd he can no longer verify scientific theories at any given moment 
of his existence. The doctrines of modern science have ceased to be 
consonant with common sense. The man in the streets "sees" thet nature is 
the sum-total of material objects which he.ve perceivable qualities and 
exhibit spatial relations amongst themselves. riodern .theories of physics, on 
the other hand, compel us to say that the v:orld is pn imperceptiole process, 
a complex of activity which exhibits constant patterns that are 
51 ~athematical.ly describable. 
the correc't one, it seems that we need look no farther than what we have 
inmediatel~ before us. ~he common sense idea of the·world appears to be 
true because we seem to see a world which corresponds exac'tly to the ~dea 
thet we have ot it. here we are appealing to something like a correspondence 
criterion for d.e'termining truth. ~•e know ths.t ideas are true when they 
describe exactly what we see. 
Physical theories of the world, of course, cen make no such appeal. 
As \lhitehead correctly points out, since physics. and con:mon sense have 
parted company, scientific theo;.:ies cannot claim to be verifiable at any 
given moment of our experience. Iet the scientific world view retains its 
autono:ny for other reasons. rfhe scientist has had gre<0.t success in predicting 
and even controllint:: the course 01 nature. Current scientific ideas appeal 
to u.s oecause they work. ~•e say that they are trute because they are useful. 
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The same pragma.tic criterion will lead us to say that they are false when 
we find other ones thc.t work better. This is \Vhy stacceeding generations of 
scientists ssy thot the world Views of their predecessors were mis~aken. 
i•e have two competing notions of the "'.orld then: an uncllanging 
natural one, Dnd a v~rying scientific one. They seem to be drifting farther 
and'~ farther apart ·11ith the development· of modern science. Each of -i;hem 
appeals to a different standard to verify its truthfulness. and botn 
satisfy the demands of their respective criteria. There seems to be no 
theory or cor mon stendard that can be used to mediate or to choose between.1 
them. So long as we remain within the domain of t·heory, we can only wonder 
how such a choice can be made, and wonder further if it is not a cnoice 
that can be avoiC..ed. 
(ii) Husserl's solution 
Husserl, I maintain, is addressing a genuine philosophical problem of 
no small importance in the third and fifth chapters of Ideas 1, where he sets 
out to discover the "shifting but ever-present horizon through which the 
ld ti . . . t tial . ••52 wor - .1es1s receives 1 s essen meaning. Important though the problem 
is in itself, we must not lose sight of our methodological concern. 
Husserl always has it in mind: 
We should remark in conclusion th~t the genere.lity 
with which we have stated these last reflections 
concerning the constituting of the natural world 
in absolute consciousness should give no offence ••• 
our aim.has not been to proVide a detailed theory of 
such transcendental constitutinG ••• \fhat is essential 
for our purpose is to see upon evidence th9t the 
phenomenolo6ical reduction ••• is possible ••• and that 
when carried out, the absolute or ?Ure trag~cendental 
consciousness is left over as residuum ••• 
Here Husserl explicitly states that his main concern in treating this 
/ 
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problem is a methodological. one. He offer$ .only the bare outline of a 
solution because he wents more than anything else to demonstrate what it 
means to bracket something. Careful observation should also tell us whether 
his method correspo~ds with his methodology. 
f{usserl finds that science and common sense offer us only derivative 
ideas about nature. In ch.apter three (The Thesis of the !fotural Standpoint 
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and Its Suspension~ he proposes to make clear to us what we mean by saying 
that we look at the world "from the natural standpoint" or in a common 
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sense way. It should then also be clear what he mean~ by suspending the 
natur&J.. viewpoint. In the same chapter he scrutinizes the scientific 
viewpoint, by examining the world of mathematics. 
In Chapter five (The Region-of Pure Consciousness), he tries to point 
out the logical possibility, "but r~al absurdity" of a (mathematical) 
world outside our own. FinaJ.ly he tries to determine whe.t ltind of meaning 
we can gi\'e on phenomenological grounAS to the statement that there is a 
world. 
Genuine phenomenological. description, according to Husserl's theory, 
becomes possible only after a reduc:::.ion has directed our attention to what 
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should be observed. However, in this case,· before the application of 
brackets, Husserl tries to show how the world presents itself to us when 
we look at it from the natural. standpoint; he outlines the backgrounds on 
Which perceived and intuited objects appear; and he tries to describe the 
essentic:l connections which hold amongst the world, the intuitive backcround, 
and the field of perception. How can we reconcile this practice wi ta his 
theory of method? 
Husserl says thC1t from the naturcl stcnd;Joint we are aware of a world 
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without spatial or temporal limit. At first glance this seems to be a bald 
st~tement that we live in an infinite v1orld. But his subsequent analyses reveal 
57 that this is not what he meant. Experience tells us that this world is 
inhabited by individuals -- corporeal things, animals and people. Every 
object of k11owledge presents itself as a figure on a background of 
perception. 0 What is actually perceived ••• is partly pervaded, partly 
girded about with a dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate 
reality"58 This indeterminate background or perceptual field is very 
lir:tited. 
. ,, 
But we can transcend its limits. ·Husserl observes that he can ••• let 
his attention wander through unseen portions of his room behind his back, to 
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the veranda, the garden, and children outdoors. As he successively directs 
his attention to each ·ei:t these things, it presents itself .as an object on 
the intui.tive background of the others. 'l'his gradually constituted field 
of .intuition can form ·11a continuous ring around the actuel fiei_d of 
60 perception." The field of intuitive presence, although larger than that 
of perception, is limited by one•s intuitive and retentive powers. 
It still remains to be eXplained what Husserl means by say!ng thet we are 
aware of a world without spa~ial limit. 'i'he clue to this explanation can be 
found in Husserl's notion of the intuitive field, According to him, the 
field of intuitive presence is COillposed not only of formerly intuited objects, 
but also all those things to which we have not yet directed our attention. 
Husserl says that objects, animals and men 
are present in my field of intuition even when I 
pay them no attention ••• For me real objects are 
there, definite, more or less familiar, agreeing 
with whet is actuc:il.1.Y perceived without being 61 themselves perceived or even intuitively present. 
\ 
At this point nusserl is plainly suceesting that our Collll!lon sense notion of 
the world is not a constitu~ive concept. .he sum-tota.L of materia1 objects 
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etc., is a ''misty horizon that can never be completely outlined". 
It is the horizon from which things appear when we become aware of ~aem. 
r.hat can Husserl mean by saying that we .are natural.LY aware of a world. 
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without any spatial limits? What more than that we are aware of our cognitive 
limitationsr ~very single thing that we know has been selected from tne 
sum-total of all things. Ultimately it stands out from this background, but 
it appears to us on a background whicfi is limited by our cognitive povrnrs. 
And ye-r, no one m:;..stc.kes the .limits of this background for the end of the wor.1.d. 
~e use our common sense notion of the world to regulate the 
constitutive process we call knowledge. By directing our atcention to 
several different obJectG, we can constitute a picture of them all. We 
"seet1 that the world is something more than what we know after any given 
amount of cognition. This "something more" points always toward the ideal of 
knowing all things, an ideal which is impossible to realize com_!Jletely, 
but necessary for the advancement of knowledge. 
It belongs to the essence of the natura.L si;andpoint to think that the 
world, or sum-totol of obJects is "out there", waiting to be discovered. 
All doubting and rejecting of the data of the natural 
world leaves standing thege.nera.l thesis of the 
natural stand9oint. "The" world is ••• always there; 
at the most it is at odd points "other·• than r 
supposed ••• but the "it" remains ever in the senses 
of the general thesis, a world that has its being 
out there. 63 
"•e may be mistaken now and thon about one thing or another, but' our f<;i~h 
thc:;t the world is "out there'; remains unshaken. This natural attitude is the 
source of our common sense notion of the world. 
we are now in a position to understand whst Husserl means by a 
suspension of the natural. attitude. He means precisely to "suspend" our 
be..Lie:f that the sum-total of all objects is out there. ·this ·•suspension" 
of belief, however, does not require us to believe that the world does not 
exist. As Husserl says of the suspension: 
It is not a transformation of the thesis into its 
antithesis; it is also not a transformation into ••• 
' indecieion"._.qoubt~ ••. R.atheir j_·:t: ·is something quite 
unique. We. do not abandon the thesis we have adopted, 
we make no changes in our conviction. 6 4 
Odd though it may sound, Husserl is suggesting that we can "suspend" our 
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common sense notion of the world without changing our conviction that it exists. 
How can such a thing be possible? Although the procedure seems to be 
self-contradictory, a closer examination reveals that it is not. Husserl 
merely means to suggest that we ce.n retain our b'elief ·as long as -we leave -
it unexpressed during phenomenological investigation: 
this entire natural world therefore which is 
continually "there for us", "present· to our hand" 
an9 will ever remain there, :Ls a "fact-world" of 
which we will continue to be conscious, even though 
it pleases us to put it into rackets • 
••• I do not then deny the world as though· I 
were a sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as 
though I were a septic; but I use the "phenomenological" 
epocke' which bars me from using any judgment 
that concerns spatio-temporal existence.6;; 
The phenomenological suspension is unlike the eristical argumen.t _a_.S.ophist _ 
might use to make it appear that there is and is not a world out there. Nor 
is it like the denial of the sceptic who disbelieves that there is a world. 
As long as. the natural attitude is supposed to be suspended, the phenomenolo5ist 
simply refrains from expressing any opinion at all about the sum-total of 
individual things, or e.ny individual thereof. However, it remains for 
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Husserl to show that there is anything left to talk about. What else has 
existence besides individuals? 
Husserl postpones this question until he has scrutinized the scientific 
worldvi.ew. This he does in two stages. First he refers to the "ideal worlds" 
b hi 66 a out m. Then he undertakes to show the logical possibility but real 
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absurdity of a mathematical "world" outside our o\vn. 
Husserl's investigation of the ideal worlds about him is an attempt to 
articulate in ph~nomenological terms the world view of modern science; he 
tries to show how the world of arithmetic presents itself; he shows th&t it 
is much like our world of common sense. But in the end he is forced to 
admit that the world views of common sense and science cannot be reconciled 
on phenomenological grounds. 
Modern science would have us believe that the world is an imperceptible 
process exhibiting mathematical patterns. ·rhe ideal world of mathema·cics 
manifests itself when we are occupied with numbers. in a wa:y it is much 
~ike the world of perception. ~ach number stands out from the background of 
those we have been paying attention to. ·J.·lle focus of our vision is 
surrounded by the sum-total of all number combinations, a mathematical. 
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aorizon which is partly defined, and partly not, out obviously there. 
There is, however, one important difference. 'l'he natural world is always 
Present in the background of consciousness. On the other hand, the world of 
c::rithmetic is present only so long as we ousy ourselves witi1 numbers. When 
Me cease mathem~tical operc.tions, the \'lorlei of numbers is suspended, while 
69 the naturru. •1orld rem.:,ins. 
·rhere seems not to be any connection between them. The natural world 
t:lnd the world of mather.w.tics may preoent themselves to us to0ether, but they 
~ 70 
are not one and the same. 
A phenomenolot,ical investigation has failed to reconcile the two 
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competitive world Views. ·.rhe only alternative is tc disregard them and 
search for a more basic one which undercuts their dichotomy, Circumstances 
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would seem to call for a straightforward procedure; Husserl has suspended the 
natural viewpoint; and the mathematical one has suspended itself. But in 
spite of the transitory nature of its mathematical i•world", modern science 
would have us believe that nature is an imperceptiole process exhibiting 
mathematical patterns. So Husserl is compelled to show the "real absurdity" 
of the idea of a world existing outside the one we perceive. Only 
afterwards can he produce a recognizably better idea. 
Husserl says there is no formal contre_diction in supposing that there 
exists !!'- "Real Something" outside the world we perceive. 72 But if we should 
ask what kind of evidence is needed_ to esta,blish the truth of ~he sopposition, 
there cc:n be only one answer: it must be established on the basis of what 
we can experience. 73 J.f the hypothesis of a world outside our own is 
contradicted by this eVidence, then it is nonsensical and cannot be made. 
~xperience tells us that there is no mathematical world out there. 
Husserl has already shown us that it can offer no evidence of an abiding world 
of pure numbers. nor can it be argued that the perceived and the 
mathematic<l "worlds" are integrated. We do perceive things quantitatively. 
But the vague quantities-like smaller or larger, higher or lower, nearer 
or fe>rther - which pervade our !'ields of experience do not correspond to the 
refined notions the modern scientist uses. .::iince the scientific notion of a 
mathematical world is contradicted by our experience, it is "really nonsense", 
it is a supposition which cannot be made despite its usefulness.74 
60 
The supposition that objects exist "outside" the world of percep't:ion 
iS fundamentally mistaken. The realism of LJescartes and of modern science is 
the product of the same fallacy that produced Berkeley 1 s idealism. Berkeley 
believed th~t an object of perception grows or diminishes as its observer 
approaches or retreats from it because he confused his perception With the 
object perceived:· They varied while the object did not. Berkeley committed 
the fallacy of confusing a perspected variable with its perspectival 
variations. Similarly, Husserl says, realism confuses the objects of per-
·10 
ception with the absolute exper~ences which constitute them when the objects 
of perception are thought to be perceptions themselves, it becomes necessary 
to posit a world of objects "beyond" the world of perception. 
With the elimination of the scientific world view, it becomes possible 
for Husserl to propose a more basic one. This he does in two steps. After 
noticing that there is a horizon through which the world-thesis receives its 
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essential meaning, he examines this horizon. Then he proposes to tell us 
what kind of meaning can be ascribed to the term "world" on its grounds. 77 
Besides the sum-total of all perceivable objects and all possible 
number combinations, we know thDt there exists also our consciousness of them. 
Husserl suggests that consciousness would persist even if the world did not. 
What does it mean .to say that we are aware of the world from a 
phenomenological standpoint? It means we know that our experience exhibits 
certain coherent patterns. By restricting our attention to the fields of 
consciousness and the objects constituted therein, we find that we can speak 
of a world because those things are "put together" harmoniously. Husserl 
says that when we bracket our common sense notion of the world, we admit: 
it is conceivable that our experiencing function 
swarms with oppositions that cannot be evened 
out... that the things it puts together should 
persist harmoniously ••• , and that its conuectedness ••• , 
--th~t a world, in short, exists no longer. 78 
our experience exhibits coherence, harmony, and connectedness. Through them 
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we come to be aware of the world• Without them, it could not be said to exist. 
This horizon through which we become aware of the world directs Husserl 
towards something that is more fundamtnatl than the totality of existent 
things. The perception of a totality of things is possible only if they can 
be seen to co-exist harmoniously. The epistemological priority of such a 
harmony prompts Husserl to say that: 
Reality and world, here used are just the titles for 
certain valid unities of meaning, namely, unities of 
meaning related to certain organizations of pure 
absolute consciousness which dispense meaning and 
show forth its validity in certain essentially fixed, 
specific ways • 
••• the whole being of the world consists in a certain 
"meaning" which presupposes absolute consciousness 
as the field from which its meaning .is derived.79 
Husserl uses the term "meaning" to refer to the harmonious experience which 
occurs when we ~urn our attention from an object to single another out from 
80 its background. ~he notion of the world as the harmoniously constituted 
appearance of things, therefore, is more iundamental than any regulative 
notion of a totality, whether it be a totality of numbers, or of perceivable 
things. Both views presuppose that members of each totality can be harmon-
1ously constituted. An object perceived to be in the world is one which can 
be selected from the background of another object, and perceived to exist 
harmoniously with it. 
liv) Husserl's Method. 
Husserl's description of things lJ.ermonious1:Y I?Utt:i.IJ.g themselves toe;ether 
addresses 1.hitehead•s problem fairly successfully. lie has established 
(against common.sense) that there cannot be a totality of perceivable things 
that does not put itself together harmoniously, and (against modern physics) 
that the idea of a purely mathematical world is really absurd. 
Again, ilusserl 1 s method of treating the problem corresponds roughly to 
his methodology. ~is theory of description is verified once more. But in 
spite of our hopes to the contrary, his use of brackets does not completely 
illustrete his theory of reductions. nor does it clarify the relationship 
betueen descriptive and reductive projects. 
Husserl describes the world as the "meaning"; or harmonious persistence 
of objects. He took five steps to reach this conclusion. First, he observed 
that the world is composed of indiViduals. He clarified his awareness of 
the world by observing objects in front of him, and by thinking of others 
behind his back. He analysed his awareness of the world by distinguishing 
his perception of those in front of him from his intuition of those behind 
him. After perceiving and intUiting a variety of the in~vidual.s. that 
compo2e the world, he found that his awareness of all of them retain~d the 
structure of a figure on a background. Because of its persistence, it is 
thought to be essential to our awareness of it. Finally, he noticed that 
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things known to exist together, composing the world, are essentially connected. 
'.i.'hey put themselves together harm?niously in his field of attention as he 
turned from one object to another. Finally he is able to say what he thinks 
the world is. Although his description could have been more straightforward, 
it follows the general lines indicated by his theory. 
The suspension of the natural viewpoint contributes little to Husserl's 
~, theory of reduction. Al though his methodology ~i~~~ngµ~~l!_e_s _plJ.il,g~so:;:i)lj._~ l~~~  
~ 
, eidetic, and pllenomenolo£ical reductions, and suegests that they should be 
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applied consecutively, ttusserl•s suspension of the natural. viewpoint displays 
characteristics of aJ.l three of them. It eliminates the common sense theory 
that the wor:Ld is the sum total. of individuaJ.s, as a philosophical reduction 
should. Like an eidetic reduction, it tells us that the existence of 
individuals can be ignored. And like a phenomenological. reduction, it bars 
us from using judgments about a spatio-temporaJ.ity. Only one interpretation 
can restore a scmblanc~ of theoretical. order to Husserl's procedure. we 
cannot suppose that the suspensions were meant to be used one after the other. 
they must be interpreted as three different aspects of the same technique. 
1his interpretation, of course, is very generous to Husserl. 
~ut speculation such as this is very damaging to the relationship which 
is supposed to hold between~,descripti ve and reductive projects in Husserl• s 
theory of method. Brackets are supposed to direct the phenomenologist to 
something which can be observed and described. The principle of all 
principles leads us to believe that each step in the phenomenological. 
description should be preceded by a reduction of some sort. Actually, this 
time it holds true only of Husserl's observation of essential connections 
between objects harmoniously constituting the world. It seems to be 
preceded, not by one, but by three of them. 
Husserl's theory of reductions, as well as the theoretical relationship 
between phenomenoloe;ical projects, must be verified elsewhere. On the whole, 
Husserl's method has proven to be much less well orgc-nized than his theory 
of method and scientific ideal would lead us to believe. 
(3) Other People in the World. 
We perceive thRt the world is composed of individuals~-objects, animals, 
r-.·--
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Husserl identified the world with their harmonious composition. 
Can turn our attention from one individual to another in an unbroken stream we 
o! consciousness. The unbroken stream is possible because the two ."put 
th6mselves together" harmoniously. Husserl cal.ls their harmony a meaning. 
Individuals have meaning for a perceiver. If the world of the perceiver were 
8 
world of inanimate objects only, Husserl's thumbnail sketch would be 
complete. 
But the world is also a world of animate things--of animals and people. 
It is part of the "meaning" of my w9rld that other people should "put 
themselves together" in it, and thet it should "put itself together" for them. 
until Husserl can explain how we know that other people in the world exist, 
his world-view is incomplete. 
;_ As a final test of Husserl's phenomenological method, I propose to 
... 
exBJZO,ne the fifth of his Cprtesian .. Neditations where he tries to add to his 
world-view by explaining how we know that other people in the world exist. 
The problem is especially interesting for two reason. The first· of these 
is that the problem and Husserl's method of dealing with philosophical 
problems seem to be incommensurable. While the other person exists 
ambivalently, being at the same time a perceiVing subject and an object of 
perception, Husserl's first principle of method demands that only the giving 
of objects to consciousness should be described. Can we know another 
person as a perceiving subject?81 If so, can the phenomenon of knowing 
another person .as percei:ll'ing subject be described? These and other related 
questions attest to the fundamental importance of the problem in Husserl• s 
Philosophy. 82 
Husserl's treatment of the problem _ _i~~_so_~~~!_!~~~~~~~y interesting 
r.-----------------------------------------------------------------6-5 ..... 
because it is so di_fficul t to interpret. On the one hand~ it has been claimed 
tbat Husserl's treatment of the problem is very much like John Stuart Mill's 
83 (1800-1873). According to Mill, no one directly perceives another person 
85 subject: the existence of another subject is deduced from the behaVior of 
a body which resembles the perceiver's own. On the other hend, Husserl's 
work on the problem 
- 8 
in Ideas 2 has been compared to Edith Stein•s (1891-1942). 
Since she claimed that we perceive other people as subjects by empathizing 
with them and since Husserl believed that empathy gives us knowledge of 
85 
other people, it is difficult to reconcile Ideas 2 where he justifi~s 
his belief with the fifth cartesian meditation. Why should we infer the 
existence of something we can directly perceive¥ Does Husserl really resort 
to inference in- the fifth cartesian meditation¥ To answer these questions, 
I propose to examine Mill's, Stein's and then .nusserlis treatment,of the 
problem. 
(i) John Stuart Mill on the problem. 
John Stuart Mill examined Sir William Hamilton's philosophy with the 
purpose of trying to ascertain what eVidence it has to offer for the 
exitence of other people. According to Hamilton, the self is nothing 
but a series of feelings, and the mind is either the actual succession of 
f 1 . it "b"l"t So ee ing or s mere possi 1 1 y. rdll finds that for !1amilton, self and 
mind are practically the same thing. 
\'/hat eVidence can Eamilton offer for the existence of other people while 
he holds this doctrine of the self•t Mill finds that nami1ton 1 s doctrine 
of the self allows only one kind of evide:1ce for the existence of other 
people. His manner of posing the problem is particularly important because 
it points towards a particular kind of solution, one which has been edopted 
rr 66 
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b;;; manY modern ph1.losophers. Mill asks: 
By what evidence do I know, or by what considerations 
am t led to believe that there exist other sentient 
. creatures; that the walking and speeking figures which 
l see and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or, in 
other words, possess ~1nds? The most strenuous Intui-
tionist does not include this among the things that I 
know by direct intuition. I conclude it from certain 
things, which my experiences of my own states of feeling 
proves to me to be marks of it.87 
The problem of knowing other people, for Hamilton, for t:ill, and for 
their moderu successors is the problem of knowing other minds. 
Furthermore, r-;111 construes mind in a way that makes direct knowledge 
of oth~r minds impossible: a mind is only a series of states of feeling. 
While one mind ma.y think or feel similarly about the same :thing as another, 
neither can have the thought or feeling that the other has. What would it 
be like for you to think my thoughts or for me to feel your· feelings·, such-
an idea does violence to the notion of two separi;tte minds~ Nill claims that 
we are not directly aware Of other minds and,therefore, are not directly 
aware of other people •. \';e ·can see only "marks" or signs of their existence. 
Mill's experience of his own states of feeling provide him with two 
signs of the existence of others. He perceives that his own subjective 
feelings always occur in the middle of a series of events which begins with 
the modification of his body and ends with bodily behevior. Suppose, for 
example, thet someone·is sitting awkwardly in a chair. ~his modification 
of his body causes him to feel uncomfortable. oec~ use of his discomfort, he 
assuties a different position. 1"1111 would say th2.t feelings of discomfort 
are priv.ste, but the awkard position of one's body and the assu:uption of 
another position are publicly observable• r:ill believes thnt other people 
have feelings because they have bodies like his and they act <:>.s he uoes. 
--·-·--- -------·-----------·---------
·- - - -
r Th• bodies of others and their bod:ily activity, the antecedents and 
consequences of private feelings, are publicly observable. 
Mill claims he can prove inductively the existence of other people 
on the basis of these two observations. 88 In his own case, Mill thinks he 
cs.n see a series of causes: modifications of body cause subjectiv.e feelings 
which cause bodily activity. In the case of other people, i1e only claims 
to see the first and last in the series. Inductive inferences establishes 
that the series he cannot see are exactly like the ones he cen. Other 
people look and act like him. For an exact likeness it is necessary that 
they should also have feelings like his. Therefore., Mill thinks that the 
bodies of others and their bodily behavior indicate the presence of 
subjective feelings in others. This proof 1 he claims, is at least certain 
as laws of physics which rest on the foundation-of inductive inference. 
According to Mill, the possession of subjective feelings is the same thing 
as having a mind which is the same thing as having a self. Therefore, Mill 
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thinks he has evidence sufficient to prove that other people exist even though 
he does not think that he can see them. 
(ii) Edith Stein on the problem. 
Mill thought that the most strenuous intuitionist would never claim 
to have immediate knowledge of other people's feelings. This is precisely 
What Edi th Stein claims we have. 89 She says tha.t the world-in which we live 
is not only a world of physical bodies, but also of experiencing subjects 
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external to us, whose experiences we know. Although we are sometimes 
mistruten or deceived, we can usually grasp the feelings of other people. 
She designates the acts in which- foreign.experience is grasped as acts of 
t-em_p_a_t_b_.y_, _a_._n_d_s_h_e_m_a_k_e_s_i_t_h_e_r_t_a_sk __ t_o_o_b_s_e_r_v_e_a_n_d_d_e_s ... c ... r ... i_b_e_a""c'"'"t_s_o ... f_e ... m ... p•a•t•h""'y---..1 
their e;reatest essential generality. 91 in 
The essence of empathy is compared with those of other acts of 
consciousness. Miss Stein frames the example of a friend who tells her 
he bas lost his brother. She becomes aware of his pain. The important thin5 
16 not.to know how she arrived at this awareness, but what it itself is.
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It cannot be an outer perception because pain is not a spatial object. 
Nevertheless, empathy resembles outer perception in that it presents an 
object here and now, though one of a different kind. 93 In this respect 
94 it is also 1ike seeing a geometrical axiom, holding a value, or reflectins 
upon something. Each of these acts present its own kind of object. Empathy 
iS the awareness of an object of a particular kind, namely the experiences of 
other people. 
Edith Stein's description of empathy seems not to prove that we are 
directly acquainted with o.ther people as subjects. Other people exist 
ambivalently, being at the same time perceiving subjects and objects of 
perception. The pain of Edith Stein's friend seems to have been given 
her as an object of consciousness. It remains unclear how she can know 
him empathically as a perceiving subject. 
Further observations reveals th2t the experience of empathy has three 
grades or modes of accomplishment. ~dith Stein confesses that when the 
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experience of another, for example the sadness of her friend, first arises 
before her, it faces her as an intentional object. 95 .ihen she tries to clarify 
the feeling of sadness, she imagines herself in her friend's situation turned 
towards the thing that made him sad. The fulfilled meaning of sadness then 
96 becomes clear to her and she has knowledge of her friend as a subject. 
~- .n.fter an imaginctive moment, the fulf:tllmenJ_Qf:_feel~in.c . ..,q:n:--:cc-"l:~--~-111£'dec ).n 
~ 
ri__.--.------~ 
object of knowledce. 
Edith Stein thinks that we can know another person, not only as an 
b 1 b . t 97 object, ut v so as a su Jee • In either case she finds it difficUlt 
to see how anyone could advocate the view that we see nothing around us 
98 but physical soulless and lifeless bodies. 
(iii) Husserl's solution of the problem. 
99 Husserl approaches the problem of other people as though it were an 
objection o~ainst the phenomenological method of philosophizing, or to be 
100 
more specific, against the phenomenological epokhe. The epokhe reduces 
a living person like Edmnrid Husserl to the status of an impersonal ego. If 
the phenomenological reduction must precede all genuinely phenomenological 
philosophy, then its proper field of study is the transcendental ego and its 
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conscious life. Other people are not merely part of an impersona]_ ego's 
consciousness. A part of one's consciousness does not account for another;s 
otherness or for his personality;,-. It seems tnat phenomenological method 
cannot do justice to the existence of other people. 
Husserl responds to this objection by showing that the phenomenological 
reduction is necessary for a fundamental understanding of human relationships: 
he reduces his existence to that of a transcendental ego; he observes it, its 
essential rela'tionship to an alter ego, and their essential connection with 
the world in which all people live (Lebenswelt;. His description uncovers 
the most essential structure of any person's awareness of another. Its 
procedure sug&ests that instead of preventing an understanding of inter-
personal relationships, the ppokhe is required to make it possible. 1ie claims 
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to have refuted the claim that phenomenology muet be solipsistic • 
.:.iefore the reduction husserl is strcigiitforwardly aware of other people 
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as objects in the world and at the same time as subjects who experience 
104 the same world what he does. He also knows that they e.re aware of him 
in the same way, He exist~ and other people exist in the same objective 
world, yet each person has his own private experiences. Husserl wants to 
understand his existence in a world of other people. 
After applying the epokhe, Husserl can no longer differentiate himself 
from and contrast himself with others. For descriptive purpose, he is no 
ionger the usual l, this man ~dmund Husserl. lOS He is an essentially 
epistemological subject. The same holds true of otl1er people. The reduction 
abstracts an essential structure from the concrete.relationships which he 
as a person has·with other people. lt eliminates methodological concern for 
individuals and makes it possible for him to concentrate on essential. 
structures in which the knowing subject lives his life. 
·.i:o characterize the ego's own essential sphere, !-Iusserl performs 
another epokhe which is even more abstract then the .i;henomenological one; 106 
The other knowing subjects to which husserl•s ego is essentially related are 
removed from further consideration. Their living being, their cultural 
predicates, and their characteristic of belonging to the world of the ego 
are removed. The world of the transcendental ego is no longer a world 
perceived by them. At this point tlusserl parts company with Edith stein. 
His procedure suggests that in his eyes, empathic experience is not the 
ultimate foundation of our experience of other people. 107 Husserl seems 
to be searching for the foundation which makes acts of empathy possible. 
After the extra reduction, Husserl still finds it possible to experience 
something. There remains a "substratum" of the world more basic than that 
Which puts itself torether for all knowing subjects, namely that v;1d.ch puts 
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itself together for all knowing subjects, namely that which puts itself 
h f 1 f t . 108 toget er or on y one o nem. The psychic life of the ego Ylith all its 
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actual and possible experiences is completely unaffected by the brack.e ts. 
It remains for Husserl to show that our experience of other people and an 
objective world rest 9n this foundation. 
His transcendental ego perceives not only other objects but also its own 
110 identity. It belongs to the concrete essence of the ego to be made 
an object in his own world. The transcendental ego is given to himself in 
perception as an object. His body stands out from all other objects because 
only in it do consciousness and its object coincide. The animated body 
b . t hi f . th. t 11 is a su Jee w ch is kinesthet~cally aware of itsel as a moving ing. 
But perception is given with temporal horizons. It gives awareness only of 
events which occur in the living present. 
For this reason, the essence of the ego is experienced mostly in acts of 
. hi h t t• 112 consciousness w c are no percep ions. The ego, past and future, is not 
livingly present. Yet the ego retains its identity through time. Recollection 
and anticipation appresent the ego's past and future so that it may be 
identified with his living presence. The ego which existed in the past 
is the one which exists now and will continue to exist in the future. The 
identity of the ego depends upon acts of consciousness which render 
something else present besides the object of perception. Husserl says 
that these acts are . . 113 .appresentati ve. 
The transcendental ego is essentially a body-subject. It has the 
essential structure of a figure on a backgro1u1d, st:mding out as an 
animated body which is kinesthetically aware of itself as a moving object. 
l';ith the oc:?.ssage of time, it retflins its identity_.t.h~ueh-..ac.tf;,Af ap~;,es.ell.t~--~: 
ation. 
Husserl begins to outline the essence of interpersonal relationships 
bY asking us to imagine that another person enters the perceptual sphere of 
114 the ego. The reduced or essential significance of this event is thDt 
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a body appears. The perceived body has two essential cho~acteristics: it is 
a part of the ego's world of experience; and it resembles e.nother objec~ in 
that world--the ego's own body. The latter of these two properties in the 
foundation of interpersonal relationships. 
Husserl says thDt only a similarity connecting that body over there 
with the ego's body can serve as the basis for identifying that body as 
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another person. Their similarity makes them a pair, two members of a kind. 
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They belong to a plurality of distinct but similar objects. The 
membership of individuals in groups like this one is a universal phenomenon 
of the transcendental sphere. Membership .in the same group allows one 
individua.l to be understood in terms of another. As Husserl says, in 
members of a group we find "an. overlaying of each with the sense of the 
th "117 o er. When a body v.rith determinations similar to his is paired with it 
as a member of the same group, it appropriates in virtue of its membership 
118 the sense of a living, moving organism. The body of the ego and the body 
of the other are essentially related on the basis of their similCU' 
determinations. 
Because of the similar determinations of the two bodies, there is 
an essential relstionship "overlaying" them. The body of the other is 
intended as a member of the cle.ss of living, moving ti1ings. Its membership 
11 119 is verified by 11 j_ts ch:n[;ing but incessantly harmonious behavior. 
The essential connection between the two bodies does not yet provide 
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us with the foundation of our knowledge of other people. 'l'he other person 
exists ambivalently, being at .the seme time a perceiving subject and the 
object of a perception, while Husserl's transcendental ego se'ems to know the 
other only as an object. ·ro prove that this knowledge is the foundation of 
0 ur knowledge of other.people, he must explaiA how, on its basis, the 
other is appresented as a subject who is a perceiver. 
t'he key to the problem of knowing another subjectively is Husserl's 
idea of the body-subject. ~very li~ing 1 mov.1.ng bod~ is kinesthetically aware 
of itself. .i'io matter where ·it moves, the body-subject always perceives itself 
"Here" in the centre of its reduced wo~ld •. The other is always perceived 
110ver There." Nevertheless, the transcendental ego can vary its position 
to that of the other. ~urthermore, he can freely imagine what the objects 
in his world look like from the other side without actually going there. 
It is possible to know the far side of thi~gs without actually moving over 
there because the front of any object of perc~ption appresents a rear aspect 
and prescribes a determination to it. 120 Husserl claims to know the other ego, 
not merely as a. perceived object like himself, but as an apperceived subject 
having the srune structure of experience he should have if he were to go 
ov3r there and be where he is. 121 At this point Husserl has dissociated 
himself from ~ill. Apperception is not an inference or even a reflective 
t 122 ac • 
The transcendental ego and any other are essentially related as 
subjects who perceive the same things in the same way from any given position. 
On the basis of this relationship we are supposed to know one another as 
people living in the same world. out Husserl can say the.t his tranncendental 
er;o and any other exist in the same world only if he can show how the srune 
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' object can be perceived by both of them. 
Again, the key to the problem is Husserl's notion of the body-subject. 
ttusserl states the problem of knowing the same object in terms of the body 
of the other. He asks how we can say that the body which appe.:rs •iQver 'J:here 11 
is the thich appears "Here" for the other subject. 123 ·1·he to him same one 
problem, he suggests, is essentially the same as the problem of the identity 
of·, the transcendental ego which moves here and there as time passes. It is 
provGn to be the same by acts of appresentation. Similarly, the body of the 
other, perceived to be uover There" by the ego, is appresented to the ego as 
the body "Here" for the other. When both sides of·an object are presented 
in the same stream of consciousness, they can be identified as belonging to 
the same object. '.J.:he same holds true of any other object. Another• s 
experience of it C<·n be appresented to the transcendental. ego is the same way. 
In this manner, a social reality and all ~ts cultural objects are given 
to different subjects existing in the same world. The ultimate cultural 
products of these appres~ntations are the personalities of the two subjects 
related to each other. ~he world of other people integrates the physical 
world and the world of culture. Husserl calls it the world of life 
(Lebenswel t). 
The fifth of Husserl 1 s Cartesian J':edi t.:,tions proves thet the 
reductions are indispensible for an understanding of the foundation of 
interpersonal relationships. To put the matter a little differently, it 
Would be a mist~e to think of Husserl's later Lebenswelt philosophy 
as a repudiation of his earlier work. It would £11.so be wrong to look at 
the1:1 as discontinuous projects. '.i'ranscendcntal egology and the philosophy 
of Lebenswelt ulli1:1ately are inter;r;;l parts of a single ·:;>lan. Husserl's 
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own words speak eloquently of his singleness of purpose: 
For the present it must suffice that we have 
indicated these problems of a higher level as 
problems of constitution and thereby made it 
understandable that, with the systemc.tic 
progress of transcendental-phenomenolocical 
explication of the apodictic ego, the 
transcendental sense of the world must also 
become disciosed to us ultimately in the full 
concreteness with which it is incessantly 
the life-world of all of us.124 
(iv) Husserl's Method 
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Husserl's approach to the problem of the foundation @f knowledge of othe1 
people has led him beyond the "solutions11 offered by John Stuart Hill and 
Edith Stein. For Mill, the problem of knowing the existence of other people 
is the problem of knowing other minds. He thinks that we know the existence of 
other minds, not intuitively, but by inferring it from the similar behavior 
of the bodies of others and our own. Husserl, on the other hand, does not 
reduce the problem of knovring other peopJ.e to the problem of knowing other 
minds. He recognizes that knowlepge of the other person's body end bodily 
behavior are an essential part of our knowledge of others. According to 
Husserl, we he.ve intuitive knowledge of the existence of other minds. 
The body of the other appresents itself as a subject having the same 
experiences we would have if we stood over there where he is. 
Edi th Stein, like Husserl, claims that we have intuitive knowledge-of 
other people. Like rrusserl she claims that we know <mother person as an 
object and as a subject. But like ;.:ill, she seems to identify knowledge 
of other people witt1 knowledge of their minds. ~mpathy is the name she gives 
to the intuitive awareness of other people's experiences. She says that we can 
know the ex[1eriences of others as objects, or in a subjective way. The pain 
r 
of a friend, for example, can be given as an object of consciousness when 
we turn towards the cause of his sadness, we cen appropriate subjectively. 
Husserl would likely agree With Edith Stein's analysis, but he refuses to 
reduce the problem of other people to the problem of other minds. He is 
committed to the epistemological primacy of the body and bodily behaVior of 
.the other. They give us knowledge of other people first. Then it becomes 
comprehensible that we could have empathic knowledge of their present state 
i ' 125 of m na. 
Husserl treats the problem of other people much as his theory of method 
leads us to believe that he would. His description of ourknowledge of other 
people corresponds almost exactly to his theory of the descriptive project. 
However, he does not reduce the objects of his description in the manner 
prescribed by his theory of reductions. Uor does the relationship between 
the projects of reduction and description hold exactly as it should in a 
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descriptive science. _Let us examine each of these three metho~ological problems 
individually. 
Husserl's description of his knowledge of other people can be outlined 
in five steps. He begins by considering himself as an indiVidual person 
straightforwardly aware of other people as objects in the world and at the 
same time 2s subjects who experience the same world he does. Secondly he 
concentrates on himself as a transcendente.l ego, t!·ic:,t is, on the essential 
structure of his existence as a person. However, instead of clarifying the 
essence of his personal existence through free imaginative variation, he does 
so by reducing his existence to thet of a trenscendental egowhose essence he 
c&n Epprehend. ~he eidetic reduction, 1nsteLd of supplemLnting the third 
step of descriptive method, seems to have displaced the one thet comes before 
"----------------------------------------------------------------;;;ma::=:~-
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it. Nevertheless, he apprehends the transcen_dental-~go as a body-subject 
who is kinesthetically aware of himself as a moving object. He finds that he 
iS essentially connected to another as two memb~rs of the class of living 
moving organisms. The other•s class membership is confirmed by his varying 
but harmonious behavior. By imaginatively varying his position to that of the 
other., the other becomes appresented to him as a body-subject having the same 
experiences he would have if he were over there. Finally Husserl has described 
hiS awareness of himself as an indivj_duai.,the clarification of his essential 
existence as a transcendental ego, his essentinl. identity, and his essential 
connection with another. All of these steps can· be anticipated by his theory 
of phenomenological description. 
Husserl's theory of reduction does not fare so well. Theoretice1ly, the 
philosophical reduction should be followed by the eidetic and then by the 
p_henoruenological ones. But Husserl's search fo~ the foundation of. interper- • 
sonal relationships exhibits no sign of the phi_losophical epokhe. 'rhis kind 
of reduction is supposed to make the intuition of objects possible by 
eliminating speculative theories about them. _Since Husserl does begin with 
his intuitions of himself as an individual person relating to others, we might 
argue ipso facto thc:t the appropriate reduction has been performed. But this 
interpretation of his method, besides being very generous to Husserl , does 
~iolence to the self-reflectiveness of phenomenological procedure. The 
philosophicel reduction, if it has been performed at all, does not seem to be 
a step of thought "which is immediately understood. 11126 
Husserl's reduction of his existence as an individuai person to that 
of a transcendental ego seems to be an eidetic one. After the reductioru 
he is no longer an individual person who can be contras~~~ \~Jo_th_o_~her~. 
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The transcendental ego is not a unique historice.l personage, but the essential 
structure of any personality. 
Finally, Husserl's reduction of transcendental experience to the "sphere 
of 0 wnness" seems to be the ultimate refinement of the phenomenological 
reduction. At the beginning of the fifth meditation, Husserl explains.that 
the transcendental or phenomenological reduction restricts observation and 
description to the stream of pure consciousness and the unities constituted 
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within it. ·Even earlier, in Ideas 1, he has spoken of the phenomenological 
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reduction as a "graded reduction." For the first time we can see its app-
iication in different grades, the ultimate gradation being the reduction of 
the objects in the ego's stream of consciousness to the ego's kinesthetic 
awareness of himself as· an object. 
Theoretically, there is supposed to be a certain relationship between 
the reductive and descriptive projects. The philosophical reduction makes 
possible the intuition of objects, and therefore, should precede the 
intuition of individuals as instantiations of an essence. The ·eidetic 
intuition makes possible, and therefore, should immediately precede the 
apprehension of an essence (or class) itself. Fi~ally, the phenomonological 
reduction restricts the phenomonoloi:;ist to the description of the essences and 
essential connections exactly as they appear to him. 
Husserl's method of dealing with the problem of other people does not 
show many signs of this relationship. There are no indic&tions thct the 
philosophical reduction hes been employed before the intuition of individual 
objects. The eidetic reduction appears before the apprehension of the 
transcendental ego, but instead of supplementing, it appears to have displaced 
the clerificotio.n of essences throuch free i::ia_g:!:ne'.tive vrn·iation of 
indi vidual.s. Only the phenomenolocical. reduction, that is, the reduction 
of the essential being of the ego to the sphere of ownness seems to occupy 
its proper place and perform its correct function. 
Vie may conclude from this investigation: thzlt Husserl's procedure is 
much less rigorous than his theory of method would lead us to believe. 'l.'he 
time has come to correlate the results of all our investigations. 
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Chapter IV: The Adequacy of Husserl• s Idea of Phenomenology 
· It might, of course, be objected that Husserl has · 
maneuvered himself into an untenable position by his 
insistance thatphiloso~hy by nothing less than a 
strict science, but that is a criticism thatapplies 
to the ideal, not to the consistency with which 
Husserl has tried to realize the ideal. Like every 
other philosopher. Husserl was a child of his times, 
and his times would be satisfied with nothing less 
than scientific verifiebility for every proposition 
that is to be recognized as meaningful. . 
* * * * * 
Husserl himself would be the last to say that he had 
evolved during his career a complete philosophy, or 
even to say that.his method has been satisfactorily 
formulated. l'1ore than once he expressed dissatis-
faction with the formulation of that method. Of 
two things, however, he never ceased to be conVinced:-
first of all, that philosophy as he conceived it 
could develop only in accord with the scientific 
ideal he had conceived from the beginning; and 
secondly, that no development which in any way con• 
tradicted the essential laws of intentional constitu-
tion ••• could possibly be admitted as genuinely 
philosophical. 
.. * * * 
For the actual fruitfulness of this method we cannot 
look to Husserl's own wor1-ts; we must look to those 
who have, to a grec.ter or less extent, drawn much of 
their inspiration from Husserl. 
--"'uentin Lauer, 
Phenomenology: Its Genesis 
and Prospect, pp. 15~-161. 
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In Ideas 1 Husserl speaks of phenomenology as a first philosophy, not 
onlY in the sense of a science upon which mathematics, loeic and other for~al 
disciplines must be built, but also ~s the proper foundntion for the factual 
sciences. ·1'he verification of factual knowledge depends ultimately on the 
meaningfulness of the claims that we perceive things, that we live in a 
world, and that we relateto other people. In order to ver~fY. scientifically 
the meanings of these propositions, Husserl's phenomenology must s~tisfy a 
number of requirements. It must have a 11scientif:i.c" foundation, a "scientific" 
1 
method, and there must be 11 a certain harmonytt between them. 
In Ideas 1, Husserl expresses the idea of phenomenology as a descrip-
tive science of essential being operative strictly within the limits of 
immediate intUition. 2 His definition establishes the intuition of essences 
as the foundation of his new science, As the foundation of a science, the 
intuition of essence generates the demands not to speculate ~bout the unseen, 
but only to describe objects exactly as they appear. From these two fundamen-
tal demands stem Husserl's reductive and descriptive projects. The reductive 
project consists of three reductions which should be applied in order. 
Similarly, the descriptive project is composed of five methodical steps, 
each of which builds on the insightfulness of the one which precedes it. 
The foundation of phenomenology gives priority to the reductive project. 
Each reduction is a section of the handrail that helps us up the stairs of 
insight one step at a time. 
The aforementioned harmony between the foundGtion and methods of 
phenomenology is what makes them scientific. Quentin Leue.r suggests that 
Husserl, being a child of his times, could be satisfied with nothing less than 
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scientific verifiability for every meaningful statement. He also sugeests 
that this ideal is untenable. Our investig~tiona of Husserl's attempt to 
determine exactly the meaning of factual knowledge indicates that he has not 
maintained his standards of scientific endeavour. However, we are not yet in 
a position to say whether Husserl's is an untenable ideal. 
Lauer confrontes us with the task of determining whether the distance 
between Husserl's methodology and his method can be bridged. He suggests 
that it can, but not in the context of Husserl's philosophy. Lauer says that 
for the fruitfulness of Husserl's method, we cannot look to his o~n work. We 
must look to other philpsophers who have dravm much of their inspiration from 
him. Husserl's idea of phenomenology may serve to characterize, not his own 
philosophy, but that of other philosophers who are supposed to be following in 
the direction towards which he led. Let us therefore also consider briefly 
the wor.k of a man who has drawn much of his inspiration from Husserl, namely 
Jean-Paul Sartre. 
(1) Its Adequacy with Regard to His Own Work. 
The problem of the foundation of factual knowledge can be sub-divided 
into smaller problems, the problem of the object of perception, the world of 
object~, and other people in the world. We have investigated each of them in 
detail. Let us now correlate the results of our investigation_s, take a final 
mee.sure of the distance between Husserl's theory and his practice, and 
determine whether the gap between them can be bridged. Husserl's idea of 
phenomenology calls for descriptive and reductive projects; its foundation 
gives to reductive endeavours. 
Husserl's idea of scientific description corresponds almost exactly with 
his descriptive nractices. JU.s desc~i:ption. oCthe object of perception 
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involves five steps, each of which follows in the order prescribed by his 
theory of description. 3 Husserl's description of the world of objects also 
corresponds exactly to his theory. 4 The lone exception occurs in his descrip-
tion of other people. There, instead of bringing his essential existence as a 
person to complete clarity by free imaginative variation, he brackets h,is 
individuelity and considers himself as an essentially epister.:!ological subject, 
a transcendental ego. Despite the omission of the second step required by 
Husserl's theory of description, he completes his project in the way his 
5 theory demands. Except for this one omission, his procedure is a precise 
application of his methodology9 
All evidence indic2tes that Husserl's theory of description, far from 
being untenable, is almost within reach. The only departure from his theory 
points to a gap in Husserl's philosophy which can and must be closed. The 
clarification and analysis of the exact relationship between one• s real 
existence as a unique historical personage and one's essential existence as a 
transcendental ego deserves much more attention than Husserl has given it. 
'rhe clarification of their relationship would probagly open the door to a 
reconciliation between Husserl's transcendental egology and other projects 
like Merleau-Ponty•s phenomenoloey of the body as a subject. such a 
reconciliation would require a grea.t deal of work, but no new methodological 
principles. 
Husserl's theory of reductions does not correspond nearly as closely with 
his reductive practices. In fact his theory and practice are so far apart 
thet it is doubtful whether we can speak of a correspondence between them at 
all • Husserl's thC'ory of reductions demands that the philosouhical reduction 
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reductions. while examining the object of perception, Husserl reverses this 
order, applying the phenomenolocical., the eidetic, and then the philosophical 
reductions, after vrhich he applies the phenomenological reduction again. unly 
6 the application of eidetic brackets agrees with uusserl's theory. During his 
investigations of the world of objects, Husserl suspends only the natural 
viewpoint. Its suspension exhibits characteristics of all three reductions, 
which leads us to believe that he has applied them all at the same time. 7 
This procedure is incompatible with Husserl's theory of reductions • 
.1.,.inally, Husserl 1 s consideration of our knowledge of other people comes closest 
to the reductive procedure demanded by his methodoiogy. Although there is no 
evidence to indicc:te that he has deliberateJ.y applied the philosophical 
reduction; the eidetic .and phenomenological reductions follow in the proper 
8 
order. Only the absense of the philosophical reduction is lacking to make 
his procedure correspond with .Ilia theory of method. So there is still a 
chance that a re-examined and amended reductive method will correspond 
with his theory of reductions. 
However, there is enough evidence to demand, not only a re-examination 
of Husserl's reductive practices, but also of his theory of reduction. Lauer 
seys that husserl was never completely satisfied with any formulation of his 
theory of method. iierbert Spiegelberg points out the reductive project as the 
object of his dissatisfaction: 
Even in his last decade Husserl was in the habit 
of stating that no adequate account of the 
phenomenolocical reduction had appeared as yet; 
in fact, in his correspondence he referred to it 
as the most difficult thing ever attem~ted in 
philosophy, much as he insisted on its indispen-
sableness for a genuine phenomenology.9 
We can only conclude from thei:;e observDtions that Hw::serl does not apply his 
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brackets scient1fical.Ly. A doubt is also cast upon the usefulness of the 
theory of reductions we attributed to Husserl in chapter two. 11 more 
adequately developed theory of reductions or a more disciplined application of 
his theory, or both, are re:;uired if Husserl's phenomenology is ever to become 
a scientific discipline. 
Finally, the foundation of phenomenology on the intuition of essence 
demands that the reductive project should have priority over the descriptive 
one: the philosophical reduction is supposed to precede the intuition of 
individuals, the eidetic reduction should precede the intuition of their 
essences, and the phenomenological reduction ensures that everything is 
described only as it appears. In his investigation of perceived objects, 
the phenomenological reduction led to the observation of individual 
conscious events, the eidetic reduction to their clarification and analysis, 
and the philosophical reduction to the intuition of their essential 
10 
connections. · When Husserl investigated the world of objects, he applied 
all three brackets at once. Their application was followed by the intuition 
of essential connections amongst objects. 11 In his examination of inter-
personal relationships the eidetic reduction preceded the consideration of 
his essential existence as a transcendental ego, and the phenomenological 
reduction led to his description of the ego in relation to another. 12 Only 
in the case of his investigation of other people does the actual relationship 
between projects bear any resemblance to the one prescribed by Husser1•s 
methodology. 
All the available evidence indicates that the actual relationship between 
Husserl's reductive and descriptive projects is not the one demanded by his 
theory of method. The phenomenological methods used by Husserl are not 
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scientific inasmuch as they are out of harmony with their foundation. A great 
deal, if not all of the required harmony, could be restored if it were 
possible for Husserl to re-formulate his reductive project. 
Husserl's idea of phenomenology does bear some resenblance to his 
actual philosophy. He describes things almost exactly the way his idea 
demands that he should. Only his reductive practices, and perhaps also his 
theory of reductions, should be reformed. Husserl's interpreters agree that 
he was never able to carry out such a reformation, never able to make 
phenomenology a science himself. Nevertheless, his idea remained as the goal 
towards which he worked all his life, a promised-land which he was able to 
enVision at least,in part. 
·(2) Its Adequacy with Regard to the Work of Sartre. 
Although Husserl has failed to put his idea of phenomenology to 
practice, it would be premature to condemn it as untenable without seeing 
how successful his followers have been. As Lauer says, we may have to look 
to the men who have been inspired by Husserl to judge the fruitfulness of 
his method. His influence on Jean-Paul Sartre can hardly be doubted. Sartre 
spent a considerable amount of time studying and absorbing Husserl's 
. 13 philosophy. The question is which of Sartre's works we should measure 
against Huoserl's idea. 
Nearly all of Se.rtre 1 s works could be cclled phenomenoloe;ical. 
Sartre's reasons for giving them this name suggest which of his works it 
would be most appropriate to examine. In a Playboy interView published soon 
after he refused the ~iobel Prize for literature, he seid that: 
••• I discovered "phenomenology", that is, 1 learned 
that one could talk in a philosophicC'l.l way, ranging 
further, snd more scientifically even, thrui the 
r 
language of philosophic textbooks. I had the idea 
of uniting literature and philosophy in n technique 
of concrete expression--nit.!:l philosophy providing 
the method and the discipline, alld literature su~ply­
ing tile words. \'.'het interested me was unraveling the 
curious and concrete relations between things end men, 
and later between men and themselves ••• 
In my first novel, Heusea, I looked at trees and tried 
to define just what they are by means of words so as 
to t;et down to essenc·es; in other words I embarked 
on a perpetual questioning of thingE, trying to 
ascertain what they are.14 
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Phenomenology, he s?,ys, has a mode of expression the.t could be more sci en ti fie 
than the language of academic philosophy. He seems to think that the 
language of ~rt is more suitable for the description of the curious, the 
concrete and the human. For Sartre, science and art are not mutually 
exclusive. The artist can produce scientific descriptions of human 
relationships. ~artre has opened new vistas of possibility for the 
phenomenological movement. uust as phenomology may be the secret longing of 
modern academic philosophy, 15 so Sartre hints that works of art may secretly 
be phenomenological. 16 Phenomenology may be modern philosophy striving to 
become literature • 
.nusserl, with his special interest in the philosophy of mathematic, 
logic and science, could hardly have anticipated this development. ·.i:he only 
way to determine its correspondence with Husserl's idea of phenomenology is 
to examine one of Sartre's popular literc:ry works in hopes of sorting out his 
descriptive and reductive endeavours, and their common foundation. 
ln Sartre's short story, 11The Wall", we find a descriptive project 
involving the five steps demanded by r~usserl 's theory of method. Pablo I bbieta 
and Tom Steinbock are introduced at the beginning of the story as two 
individuals with nothing in common except that they are both prisoners by the 
r~ 
r fascists 
I 
17 during the Spanish civil was. 
Subsequently events in the story make it clear to them that they are 
•aiting to be executed. 
Sartre then presents them as instantiations of an essence seen through 
the eyes of Pablo Ibbieta: 
I looked at him {Tom) sideways for the first time 
he seemed strange tom:=: he wore death on his face ••• 
For the past 24 hours I had lived next to Tom, I 
had listened to him.and !.realized we had nothing 
in common. And now we looked as much alike as 
twin brothers 1 simply because we were going to 
die together. 18 
Tom 1 i:> and Pablo's real enstence, their individuality, is suspended, as it 
were, by consciousness of their impending death. They are paired as members 
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of the same class, we find an overlaying of each with the sense of the other. 
Pablo sees Tom as a manifestation of death. 
Sartre.traces the connections. amongst death and other essences through 
the eyes of Pablo Ibbieta. Pablo tries in various ways to imagine what death 
is. None of these variations reveals anything more about it. But when he 
gives up and begins to think of his past~ he discovers that awareness of life 
and death are inseparable connected. Death is something that he cannot turn -
away from. His whole life appears before him in a crowd of memories. He sees 
it has been a lie. Because he never.thought of death, he had spent his life 
. 19 
counterfeiting eternity. · until this very moment he had understood nothing, 
neither dee.th nor life. After realizing the essenticil connection between them, 
Pablo turns c:.wc:y from the past. It no longer has any value for him. 
The reason for their essential connection soon becomes evident. 
Because of his heightened awareness he is able to see his situation in a new 
lig~t. lie sees thats 
••• objects hc:..d a funny look: they were more 
obliterated, less dense then usual, It was 
enough for me to look at the bench, the lamp, 
the pile of coal dust to know that I was going 
to die. Naturally I couldn • t think clearly · 
about my death but I saw it everywhere, on 
things, in the way things fell back andk:ept 
their distance discretely, as people who 
speak quietly at the bedside of.a dying men. 
It was his death Tom had just touched on the 
bench. '2U 
Knowledge of life and death are inseparable for Pablo because the death he 
anticipates is his own •• Life and death are properties of the individual. 
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They are essentially connected because of their subsumption under this higher 
genus. We might way that, in Sartre's philosophy, the anticipation of 
one's death is one of the things that makes one an individual.. It is a 
principle of individuation. 
Sartre's short story exhibits, not only a descriptive projec't;, but also 
a kind of reduction. Under the sentence of death, Pablo's life as an 
21 individual is suspended. Even though he esc?pes execution by a surprising 
turn of events, he is condemned to live the rest of his life as it were, 
between the brackets of birth and death. He, the soldiers guarding him, 
and everyone else, are condemned to die and must wait for their sentence. 
The only difference he observes is that some were going to die a little 
22 later than him. Pablo Ibbieta• s be;ing-towards-death, as imagined by Sartre, 
is remarkably similar to Husserl's remarks about the existential import of 
his reductive project. Spiegelberg quotes-Husserl as saying that: 
the total phenomenological attitude and the 
corresponding epokhe is called upon to bring 
about a complete personal transformation 
which mieht be compared to a religious con-
version, but which even beyond it has the 
signific~nce of the greatest existential 
conversion that is to be expected of mankinct. 23 
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The_ reductive project dem~nds a complete personal transformation, a religious, 
or an existential conversion. A complete personal transformation is precisely 
wh~t Pablo Ibbieta has experienced. 
The foundation of Sartre's phenomenological efforts in "The Wall" seems 
to be the intuition of essences;. But since he fails to distingUish varieties 
of reduction, we ~annot say that the phenomenology he builds upon it is 
scientific by Husserl's standards. We can say, however, that he has been no 
less successful than Husserl in approaching them. Husserl's idea of 
phenomenology applies to Sartre's literary works as well as it does to his 
own academic philosophy. 
(3) Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology Compared to 
Samuel Johnson's Idea of Good Literature 
Some art may be phenomenological, even by Husserl's stand~cds. This 
fact raises a question. Some artists, like Sartre, may be Self-conscious 
phenomenologists. But may it not be the case that something·in the nature 
of art itself makes it inherently phenomenologicaJ.2 Because Samuel Johnson 
(1709-1784) is to modern literary criticism what Husserl is to 
phenomenology, it seems appropriate to settle the question by comparing 
Johnson's standard of excellence in literatnre With Husserl's idea of 
scientific phenomenoiogy. 
In his "Preface to Shakespeare", Johnson contrasts the absolute and 
immediately recognizable excellence of demonstrative sciences with that of all 
other works which is recognized only gradually and by comparing them to others. 
He says the.t in li tere.ry works which, by their very nature, appee.l only to 
observation and experience: 
Johnson's 
Nothing can please many and please long but just 
representations of genezal nature ••• 
Shakespeere above all writers, at least above 
all modern writers, is the poet of nature ••• 
His characters act and' speak by the influence of 
those general passions and principles by which 
all minds are agitated ••• In the writings of other 
poets a character is too often an individual; in 
those of Shakespeare it is commonly a species.24 
claim that works of art appeal only to observation and exper-
ience for standards of excellence establishes the intuition of objects 
25 
as their foundation. The objects he appeals to are those of a general 
nature, general passions and principles, and kinds of people. In Husserl's 
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terminology, he is appealing to the intuition of essences. ureat works of art, 
he says, are nothing more than "just representi.tions of a general nature." 
Only great works of art, then, can be phenomenological. 
The only difference between Johnson•_s idea of good art and Husserl's 
idea of phenomenology has to do with science. As fal' as Johnson could see, 
science and art were mutually exclusive because he thought that art was 
based on observation, while science was demonstrative. uur ideas of art 
and sc.:i..ence have changed considerably since Johnson's time. The task Husserl 
sets himself is precisely that of making observation and description a 
scientific project. Because Husserl failed to accomplish his task, we 
might say tnet his actua1 philosophy corresponds more closely to 
<.Johnson's idea of good literature than it does to his own idea of 
phenomenology. i'le miEht c;.lso sey, as Johnson would heve said, that only the 
pessage of time and the judgment of future generations can determine how great 
a philosopher Eusserl actually was. i1e cvn, however, say a few things about 
his ideal. 
r 
(4) Ten Conclusions about Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology. 
1. The nouular slogen "Back to·the things themselves!" is not an 
adequate expression of Hussc-rl's idea. The expression brings to mind Hume•s 
positivistic doctrine that all our ideas are derived from simple impressions 
~hich t~eY faintly copy. But phenomenology is not like British empiricism. 
tie should not think that the things themselves of ilusserl' s philosophy are 
only emp.irical objects to. w;1ich we can return only through perception. 
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2. rtusserl thought of phenomenology as a descriptive science of essential 
being operative wit:un the limits of irnr.:;.ediate intuition. The objects of 
phenomenology are the essences or class memberships of individuals and their 
formal· relationships. Classes and formal relations are objects of which 
it is possible to be immediately aware. Scientific description of our a 
awareness Qf these objects. dema~ds a foundation in our immediate awareness 
of them, a dedication to the demands stemming from the problematic nature of 
our awareness, and a method dictated by the demanding nature of its problems. 
3. The nopular slogan 11Back to the things themselves! 11 is an expression 
of half of Hussrerl• s first principle of method. The foundation of Husserl• s 
phenomenology is the immediate intuition of essences. As a methodological 
foundation it generates the demands not to speculate about the unseen, but 
only fo describe things exactly as they appee.r. The expression "Back to the 
things themselves!" is equivalent to the mettodological coomandment to 
describe things exactly as they appear. 
4. Husserl considered his first princi1)le of method to be the foundation 
of phenomenolo&Y es e. ricorously clescriotive science. His first principle 
is the commandment not to spedUlate about the unseen, but only to describe 
-- ·"·--- ::..- _____ :~--- ·- =----~--·-
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things as they ap~ear. Its two demands are really different. Husserl gives 
the first priorit :- over ti1e second. His two demands generate reductive and 
descriptive science built upon Husserl's foundation, the reductive project 
has priority over the descriprive one. 
5. Husserl's phenomenology anproaches, but does not correspond with his 
·~- - - - . . .. 
idea of a rigorous science. He was well aware of the discrepancy between his 
ideal of phenomenological philosophy and phenomenology as he practiced it. 
A truly scientific phenomenology was, for him, a promised land upon which he 
would never set foot. 
6. He does not realize his ideal of a rigorous science because part of 
it--the reductive project~- is not sufficiently articulated. Husserl's theory 
of reductions is so unlike his reductive practices that we can hardly speak of 
a correspondence between them at all. The great distance between them calls, 
not only for a re-examination of Husserl's reductive practices, but also of 
his theory of reductions. 
7. Husserl's idea of phenomenology is at odds With phenome~olol?i.Y as 
practiced by others. Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, presents a description 
of death based on the intuition of objects. He describes various objects in 
the manner prescribed by Husserl's idea of phenomenology. But since he fails 
to distinguish varieties of reduction, we cannot say that his description is 
scientific by Husserl's standards. 
a. The artistic expression of intuited essences is as close to his own 
ideal as his own "phenornenolo[;ical " practices. Semuel Johnson's claim thc-t 
~orks of art appeal only to observation and experience for standvxds of 
excellence establishes the intuition of essences as their foundation. The 
objects he appeals to are ti10se of a general nature, gcner~l passions and 
r 
94 
principles, and kinds of people. In Husserl's terminoloey, he is appealing to 
intuition of essences. The task Husserl sets himself is precisely thc:it of 
making observation and description a scientific project. Because he failed to 
accomplish his tnsk, we micht say that by his own standards, his actual 
philosophy is an. artistic description of esse~ces, not a scientific one. 
9. The artistic impulse can be intrinsicallY phenomenological. 
Samuel Johnson says that works of art often portray only indiViduals; but in 
great art works, the individual is portrayed as the just representation of a 
general nature. The goal of Husserl's phenomenology is "faithful conceptual 
expression" in judgments general in form.· Johnson• s standard of excellence 
in art, and the goal of Husserl's phenomenology appear to be the same. 
10. Some works of art furnish phenomenological insights for philosophy. 
Sartre's short story, "The Wall", for example, offers valuable insights into 
the nature of death. Samuel Johnson claims, in effect, that the works of 
Shakespeare offer important phenomenological insights. Phenomenology, as a 
attempt to deal scientifically with qualitative-material has a great deal to 
learn from the language of art. Phenomenology requires·an expended notion of 
"completely true and steady conceptual expression." A phenomenology of art 
as language must therefore be undertaken. 
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